Cold War Technical Intelligence in Europe
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Cold War Technical Intelligence in Europe
Much has been written about the technical intelligence effort during WW II and Vietnam but little has been written about the Cold War era in the European theater. This short article will attempt to cover some of the Technical Intelligence effort of American Forces from 1946 until the demise of the Soviet Union.
The Ordnance Museum
In 1940 because of the declaration of the limited National Emergency, the Armed Forces expanded, and the Ordnance Museum building had to be remodeled for classroom use. Consequently, the collection was stored out of doors, and quickly deteriorated. By 1942, most of the items in the collection had to be scrapped. In the 1940s, G. Burling Jarrett joined the Museum staff and served as curator until his retirement in 1966. In 1943, a Foreign Material Section was established at Aberdeen to study and report on various types of equipment. During World War II large amounts of foreign equipment was sent to Aberdeen for evaluation, and later became the heart of the museum. Following the end of World War II the Foreign Material Section was disestablished, but the museum survived and became known simply as the Aberdeen Proving Ground Museum.
Between 1945 and 1950, the museum conducted important work in cataloging Ordnance equipment, as well as publishing impressive manuscripts. Among these was a notable report by Karl Kempf, on Russian equipment. Kempf (who served as curator 1967-1971), was fluent in the German language and used captured German reports to prepare in depth studies on Russian equipment. These reports became invaluable in 1950 when U.S. Forces in Korea confronted an enemy equipped by the Soviet Union. After the Korean War the collection again began to grow.
Again however; in 1967, as the U.S. Forces were preparing for their commitment in Southeast Asia, the Museum, building 314, had to be remodeled as the Headquarters for the Army's Test and Evaluation Command. As a result the Army decided to liquidate the Museum collection to avoid the cost of maintaining it. However, before any action by the Army, a group of local citizens formed a tax-free foundation to build a new home for the museum.
Assassination Attempt on President Truman's Life
Two Puerto Rican nationalists, Oscar Collazo and Griselio Torresola, attempted to assassinate President Truman on November 1, 1950. They arrived in Washington D.C. the day before from the Bronx in New York City, where they were active in the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party. They thought the assassination would call attention to Puerto Rico and advance the cause of Puerto Rican independence.
On the morning of November 1, they prepared for the assault. Torresola, a skilled gunman, taught Collazo how to load and handle a gun. They familiarized themselves with the area near Blair House, across the street from the White House, where they would stage the assault. (The Truman family stayed in the Blair House during renovation of the White House from 1948 to 1952). Collazo and Torresola planned to approach the house from opposite directions and shoot their way inside. In the ensuing gun battle, Collazo and Torresola traded gunfire with White House policemen and secret service agents. They wounded three White House policemen but never reached the interior of the house. One of the wounded policemen, Private Leslie Coffelt, managed to fire one bullet and hit Torresola in the side of the head, killing him instantly. Coffelt died later that day at the hospital. Two other policemen, Donald Birdzell and Joseph Downs, were each hit more than once but recovered from their wounds. Collazo reached the steps of Blair House before collapsing with a gunshot wound to the chest. It was later found that only one shot fired by Collazo had hit anyone—his first shot, which wounded Private Birdzell. Torresola had inflicted all the other gunshot wounds on the three White House policemen. President Truman was taking a nap upstairs in Blair House when the shooting began. He rushed to a window and saw Collazo below on the front steps. A White House guard saw the President in the window and shouted to him to him to get down. The President obeyed.
Collazo was sentenced to death for the attempt; one week before his scheduled execution in 1952, Truman commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. President Carter commuted the life sentence of Collazo in September 1979, and he was freed from prison. He died in Puerto Rico on February 20, 1994 at the age of 80.I mention this in passing as Rudi Nottrodt was driving from Aberdeen Proving Ground to Washington, D.C. with a carload of captured Soviet bloc small arms. He said he was very nervous passing through police checkpoints as he went past Blair house.
Rudi, a German born American citizen entered the service in 1944 and was commissioned in Ordnance Corps. He ended WW II at Camp King in Oberursel, Germany, where he was responsible for screening additional German scientists to be sent to the states as part of Operation Paperclip. He also helped to interrogate German POWs who were returning from Russia and later defectors and deserters. He was in charge of the military interrogation Section, which had a Scientific and Technical section, a Political Section and an Economic Section.
When these deserters arrived, they had to fill out a questionnaire, which was circulated among section chiefs to see if they wanted to interrogate the person. Out of one Polish deserter, a former teacher who had been drafted into the Russian army, Rudi managed to squeeze 58 reports, one of which was a complete T.O. & E. of a Soviet motorized Division, which at the time did not yet exist. USAREUR Headquarters felt the Nottrodt was nuts or had fallen for a fluke. Some time later, the Soviets activated these divisions and Rudi’s report became the “bible” in the Pentagon.
WELCOME TO CAMP KING:
CAMP KING IS LOCATED NORTH OF FRANKFURT, IN OBERURSEL, TAUNUS, GERMANY. IT WAS INITIALLY AN AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL. DURING WORLD WAR II IT BECAME DULAG LUFT, AS WELL AS AN INTERROGATION STATION FOR DOWNED ALLIED PILOTS, AUSWERTESTELLE WEST. THE US ARMY TOOK CONTROL AFTER W.W.II AND MADE THE SITE INTO AN INTELLIGENCE POST. THE GEHLEN ORGANIZATION WAS BASED ON THIS POST AS WELL AS THE EUROPEAN COMMAND INTELLIGENCE CENTER. LATER, IT BECAME A TRANSPORTATION POST. SINCE THE AMERICAN DRAW DOWN OF FORCES, IT HAS BECOME A GERMAN HOUSING AREA.
1952 - 1969
On October 22, 1952, the 513th Military Intelligence Service Group was constituted in the Regular Amy, and on January 15, 1953, was activated at Oberursel, Germany (Camp King). The 513th was assigned to the U.S. Army, Europe and replaced a TD organization, the 7077th USAREUR Intelligence Center. In its administrative and intelligence support role, the 513th managed an interrogation center for refugees, resettlers, and repatriates; collected documents; issued reports; and oversaw technical intelligence detachments. On October 20, 1953, the 513th was redesignated the 513th Military Intelligence Group.
In March 1953, the 501st Engineer Technical Intelligence Team, which would become the 501st Engineer Detachment (Technical Intelligence “Research”), was activated. In October 1953. Col F.O. Diereks provided the impetus, which resulted in the establishment of an Intelligence and Mapping Branch of the Engineer Division, United States Army, Europe. The Branch freed the Center from a part of its burden by assuming the responsibility for coordinating the Centers mapping and intelligence activities with interested agencies and countries. The reorganization plan also recommended the deactivation of Headquarters Company of the 7714th Engineer Intelligence Group.
In April 1954, the 139th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) was activated to perform mission duties formerly assigned to the 7714th Engineer Intelligence Group. The 139th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) is the youngest of the detachments at ETC. 15 June 1954. The 656th Engineer Battalion was relieved from attachment to Headquarters Company, Engineer Intelligence Group, 7714th Army Unit, and attached to United States Army Europe, Engineer Intelligence Center. The 7714th Army Unit was deactivated on the same day. 1 July 1959. The United States Army, Europe, Engineer Intelligence Center was relieved from assignment to Headquarters United States Army Europe and assigned to Headquarters, Special Troops, United States Army Europe, and placed under the Engineer, USAREUR, for technical direction. 27 September 1960. The 22nd Engineer Platoon (Map Reproduction) was attached to B Co of 656th Engineer Battalion.
7 August 1964. The US Army Engineer Reproduction Detachment (France) (Provisional) was deactivated and on 1 January 1965. The US Army Europe Engineer Intelligence Center was renamed the Engineer Topographic Center. On 27 April 1965. The functions of the 501st Engineer Detachment (TIR) were transferred to the USAREUR Technical Intelligence Center.
OLEG PENKOVSKY - SOVIET DOUBLE AGENT - CIA FILES
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Agency, created in 1947 by the National Security Act of 1947 signed by President Harry S. Truman, is a descendant of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II. The OSS was dissolved in October 1945 but William J. Donovan (aka Wild Bill to both his friends and enemies), the creator of the OSS, submitted a proposal to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944 calling for a new organization having direct Presidential supervision, "which will procure intelligence both by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and correlate the intelligence material collected by all government agencies." Despite strong opposition from the military, the State Department, and the FBI, Truman established the Central Intelligence Group in January 1946. Later under the National Security Act of 1947 (which became effective on September 18, 1947) the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency were established. In its creation many disposed Nazi operatives were recruited to become agents, they were offered financial packages and promised to be exempt from trial for their war crimes committed in World War II.
In 1949, the Central Intelligence Agency Act (also called "Public Law 110") was passed, permitting the agency to use confidential, fiscal, and administrative procedures and exempting it from many of the usual limitations on the use of federal funds. The act also exempted the CIA from having to disclose its "organization, functions, officials, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed." It also created a program called "PL-110" to handle defectors and other "essential aliens" outside normal immigration procedures, as well as give those persons cover stories and economic support.
During the first years of its existence, other branches of government did not exercise much control over the Agency. This was often justified by a desire to defeat and match the activities of the KGB across the globe, a task that many believed could only be accomplished through an equally ungentlemanly approach. As a result, few in government inquired too closely into CIA activity. The rapid expansion of the Agency and a developing sense of independence under DCI Allen Dulles added to this trend.
Things came to a head in the early 1970s, around the time of the Watergate affair. One dominant feature of political life during this period were the attempts of Congress to assert its power of oversight over the executive branch of government. Revelations about past CIA activities, such as assassination attempts of foreign leaders and illegal domestic spying, provided the opportunity to carry out this process in the sphere of intelligence operations. Hastening the Agency's fall from grace were the involvement of ex-CIA agents in the Watergate break-in and President Nixon's subsequent attempts to use the CIA to stop the FBI investigation of Watergate. In the famous "smoking gun" tape which led to Nixon's resignation, Nixon ordered his chief of staff Haldeman to tell the CIA that further investigation of Watergate would "open the whole can of worms" about the Bay Of Pigs operation, and therefore that the CIA should tell the FBI to stop investigating Watergate because of "national security."
DCI James R. Schlesinger had commissioned a series of reports on past CIA wrongdoing. These reports, known euphemistically as "the Family Jewels", were kept close to the Agency's chest until an article by Seymour Hersh in the New York Times broke the news that the CIA had been involved in the assassination of foreign leaders and kept files on some seven thousand American citizens involved in the peace movement (Operation CHAOS). Congress investigated the CIA in the Senate through the Church committee, named after Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) and in the House through the Pike committee, named after Chairman Otis Pike (D-N.Y.); and these investigations led to further embarrassing disclosures. Around the Christmas of 1974/5, another blow was struck by Congress when they blocked covert intervention in Angola. The CIA was subsequently prohibited from assassinating foreign leaders. Further, the prohibition against domestic spying, which had always been prohibited by the CIA charter, was again to be enforced, with the FBI having sole responsibility for domestic investigation of US citizens .
The Directorate of Intelligence, the analytical branch of the CIA, is responsible for the production and dissemination of all-source intelligence analysis on key foreign issues. .
The National Clandestine Service, a semi-independent service which was formerly the Directorate of Operations, is responsible for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence and covert action. The Directorate of Science & Technology creates and applies innovative technology in support of the intelligence collection mission.
The DS&T accesses, collects, and exploits information to facilitate the execution of the Agency’s mission by applying innovative, scientific, engineering, and technical solutions to the most critical intelligence problems. We pride ourselves on our ability to leverage technology and lead scientific innovation across the Intelligence Community. In the DS&T, we drive national intelligence collection efforts by applying tomorrow's technology today.
The DS&T is a diverse, broad based, and highly skilled organization incorporating over 50 different disciplines ranging from computer programmers and engineers to scientists and linguists. The work force designs, develops, evaluates, and deploys highly-specialized equipment aimed at providing this nation with a significant intelligence advantage. As an all-source collector of intelligence, we continually seek to push the boundaries of the state-of-the-art, infusing our collection operations with innovative techniques and cutting-edge technologies. The DS&T supports the entire intelligence life cycle through the following programs:
Open-media Acquisition & Dissemination-We collect, process, translate, and disseminate requirements-driven information and materials of intelligence value from foreign open sources.Technical Collection-We develop and deploy collection systems against the most difficult and challenging intelligence targets, attacking them through the responsive integration of analysis, technology, and tradecraft.Satellite Technologies-We support the National Reconnaissance Office in designing, building, and operating satellite reconnaissance systems to support global information superiority for the United States.Technical Support-We apply state-of-the-art technologies to the collection of intelligence in a clandestine manner, enabling our operatives to perform their mission while limiting risks.Research & Development-We research, develop, and apply advanced technologies that provide the nation a significant intelligence advantage. Technology is constantly changing and the rapid pace of change is influencing how we acquire cutting-edge technology and apply it to our business. We recognize that no single organization can expect to keep pace with the revolution in technology, and so we’re reaching out in new ways to leverage our nation’s technical expertise and bring it to bear on the most pressing problems facing the Intelligence Community.
Oleg Penkovsky
Oleg Penkovsky went from a Russian World War II military hero, to becoming America's best human intelligence asset in the Soviet Union. He believed that Nikita Khrushchev's leadership was taking the Soviet Union onto the path of destruction. Penkovsky was the highest level Soviet officer to ever spy for the United States or British Intelligence. The Penkovsky case is considered to have been the most successful Cold War espionage operation. Penkovsky was observed by KGB agents after a meeting with a British intelligence contact, which lead to his arrest and execution.
The recruitment of a well-placed spy, in this case a high-ranking Soviet military intelligence officer, lessened the tensions of the Cold War by providing information on the intentions, strength, and technological advancement of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the enormous risks for the spy himself became evident in the fate of Penkovsky, shot as a traitor by the Soviets in 1963 for spying for the United States and United Kingdom. These documents provide an over-the-shoulder look from the perspective of the CIA Director as well as from Penkovsky himself in operational meeting reports. This collection offers insights on the spy's motives as well as the fruit of his espionage for the United States. Files included: CIA reports on the top secret Soviet intelligence reports provided by Penkovsky; Penkovsky's debriefings to CIA and SIS officials during visits to England and France.
Penkovsky allowed the administrations of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy to bypass the bluster and rhetoric of Nikita Khrushchev, and to know the true facts concerning Soviet military preparedness. The files indicate that Penkovsky's acts of espionage were able to define for the United Sates the limitations of Soviet power. Through Penkovsky, the United States learned of the number of nuclear missiles the Soviets held and the problems with their guidance systems. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Penkovsky was able to provide information on how those missiles operated in the field. Soviet GRU (military intelligence) documents provided by Penkovsky, show the friction between the Soviet high command over whether Soviet military strategy should depend on nuclear weapons, or general purpose forces.
Colonel Oleg Penkovsky was the perfect spy for the United States. He was a high ranking Soviet officer in the Soviet Intelligence service. He had access to information about secret weapons, especially missiles. With his help, the United States Government was able to put together a large book on Soviet missiles. This would prove to be a valuable asset in the indentification of the newly arrived Soviet missiles.
The Military Attaché and the Liaison Missions in Berlin
When the defeat of Germany became obvious during World War 2, the three Allies (United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union) formed the European Advisory Commission in London. Its purpose was to establish a legal basis for occupation and administration of Germany. France joined as the fourth ally later. Several agreements were made in 1944/45. The basis for the Military Liaison Missions was the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, signed on November 14, 1944. Part of the agreement was the accreditation of the military with the supreme command of the other occupation forces.
Implementation of the agreement was postponed as the soviets felt the regular meetings at the control council would provide enough communication. With increasing tensions between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union the need for Liaison Missions became imminent. The Soviet Union took the initiative as they wanted control over the reparations payments in the western zones of occupation, which also included payments to the Soviet Union.
The first agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Great Britain 16 September, 1946 known as the Robertson-Malinin Agreement, after the two respective Chiefs of Staff. The British zone of occupation included the Ruhrgebiet which was the heart of Germany’s heavy industry and was thus the most important zone for the Soviets to control. The agreement included 31 members for each Liaison Mission resulting in the British Mission being the largest of the three western missions.
In April 1947 agreements between the Soviet Union, France and the United States were made. They included 14 members for the American and 18 for the French mission. The Soviets wanted larger contingents in the US and French zone as well but the two powers declined the offer. While the three western missions were all based in Potsdam , the three soviet missions were located in the three western zones of occupation. The Soviet mission to the US Forces was based in Frankfurt am Main, to the French in Baden Baden and the Soviet mission in the British zone was first located in Bad Salzuflen and later moved to Bünde.
The missions were first tasked in the observation of implementation of the agreements made at the Potsdam Conference which included the disarming and demilitarization of Germany. Another task was the establishing of communication systems between the supreme commanders. The members of the missions enjoyed a de facto diplomatic status which would become priceless when the iron curtain fell, dividing the western from the Soviet zone.
The missions' initial tasks were genuine liaison tasks. These included repatriation of Prisoners of War (PoW), location of allied service personnel graves, looking for Nazi war criminals and witnesses to Nazi atrocities as well as monitoring the distribution of food and fuel etc. In BRIXMIS' case, the intelligence gathering role was only authorized by the UK Government in 1948 during the period of the build up of the Berlin Blockade.
The MLMs were granted access to large areas of the Soviet Zone of Occupation. PRAs (Permanent Restricted Areas) around military installations and TRAs (Temporary Restricted Areas) during military exercises were marked on special maps issued to the MLMs. The primary task of the MLMs became surveillance and reconnaissance of the Soviet Forces on the ground and by air. The estimation of Soviet troop strength, observation of new equipment and military exercises became the daily routine. The Mission's role can't be over estimated as they were the first to tell a large maneuver from a buildup of troops which even could have resulted in a nuclear conflict.
The Attaché in Moscow
The term attaché has a significant and precise meaning in diplomatic usage. A military officer simply sent abroad is not an attaché; he must be accorded full diplomatic status and, as such, is afforded complete diplomatic immunity. From the beginning, the military attaché was something of a hybrid in the world of international relations. He was part diplomat, part soldier, part scout, and perhaps, as Lord George Curzon suggested, not entirely welcome. Military attaches were the Nation's eyes and ears abroad in the days before satellite photography and sophisticated electronic collection techniques. For example, most of the information about Axis armed forces before December 1941 came from routine, tedious, and often unappreciated peacetime observations by Army attaches. The services sought congressional approval in September 1888 to establish a number of Army and Naval attaché positions in Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, St. Petersburg, and Vienna. Regulations authorized wear of the aiguillette, an item of military ornamentation and the international symbol of the military attaché, in 1910. At the outbreak of war in 1914, Washington had 23 attaches assigned abroad, and they had become a regular feature of the majority of Embassies.
During the Cold War, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara designated a senior military attaché in each foreign country--the DATT--to supervise and coordinate the work of all service attaches. While every military organization requires someone in charge, the current system arbitrarily designates the DATT from the various services to particular countries. The Army and Air Attaches are often the same rank, and even though one may be vastly more qualified to serve as the DATT, principles of service equities take precedence over competence. Selecting the best-qualified officer would dramatically improve the effectiveness of military diplomacy and ultimately force all services to develop serious foreign area officer programs.
The defense attaché system structure, mission, and manning has not evolved with the changes of the last decade that require increased levels of involvement in operational activity. The primary attaché function of observing and reporting is often considered to be in direct conflict with time and energy spent on other nonintelligence activities. Intelligence and military diplomatic activity are not zero-sum competing requirements. Narrow specialization by other DOD elements has undermined the overall effectiveness of the military attaché by reducing access to the host nation military. DOD representation abroad should be the military attaché. Security assistance and arms control would be better managed by trained attaches with the requisite language skills, cultural knowledge, and regional expertise. This approach would eliminate parochialism, reduce overhead, streamline operations, and simplify bilateral coordination for the host nation military. The experiences of one such officer, Air Commodore Ted Williams was covered in the book “Cold War Hot Seat”.
Air Commodore Ted Williams, completed two tours in Moscow, as assistant air attaché (1964-1967) and later (1978-1981) as defense attaché. Apart from representational duties the role of the attaché behind the Iron Curtain was to collect information on the Armed Forces and associated industries of the host country, a far from straightforward task in those confrontational days. His brief forbade him to engage in any of the covert activities associated with espionage, such as running agents; his information had to come from personal observation and that meant extensive travel. The opposition, in the form of police and security services, sought with varying degrees of enthusiasm to make it difficult for the attaché to do his job. I also did two tours as attaché behind the Curtain, one in Budapest and the other in Prague, and after reading this book I can say that if there were a Richter scale for degrees of surveillance, harassment and obstructionism Budapest would rate 1, Prague 3 while Moscow would ring the bell at 10. Furthermore, our man in Moscow had to notify the authorities if he wished to leave the precincts of the capital. He was required to give the dates of his proposed trip, destinations, route to be taken and means of travel, which didn't make the job any easier. Just how these handicaps affected his task, the encounters with the all-pervasive KGB, with willfully obstructive or incompetent bureaucracy and with the local population as he traveled the length and breadth of the country form one aspect of this fascinating story. - But it is more than a highly entertaining travelogue. Air Commodore Williams is among the leading sovietologists in this country and there can be no one among them to match the extent of his travels in the USSR, involving least one night spent in 138 towns (with varying degrees of harassment or restrictions in every one of them). He can be likened to Heinekens beer in that he reached those parts that others could not - or would not. Fluent in Russian, with a wonderful eye for detail he certainly made the most of his opportunities to learn all he could of the people of that vast country and the system that sought to control their lives. Pursuing a thematic rather than chronological approach the author provides illuminating commentaries on the passing scene: the fall of Khrushchev in 1964 (an event worthy of Houdini, now you see him now you don't), and its impact at home and abroad; the armed forces; the reality of the threat which so exercised NATO; the decline and fall of the regime and more besides.
Dissemination of Information to the troops
There was very little effort made to get information out to the troops There were several unclassified documents prepared by the Department of the Army which dealt with Soviet and Satellite Armies and one on the Chinese Military.
These received limited distribution. On one occasion, when I visited an Armored Cavalry unit on the East German border, I ran into a mannequin with a complete East German VOPO uniform but this seemed to be the exception rather than the rule. I was a member of the US Army Permissive Action Link Detachment and the main training we got was in how to report any contact we may have had with the Soviet Military Liaison Mission.
UTIC [USAREUR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER]
Thanks to LTC Bob Naylor the following information concerns the organization of UTIC from December 1966 to May 1968. The UTIC was a TD unit with an authorized strength of 81 personnel, composed of 13 TO&E technical intelligence detachments and several Department of the Army civilian technical intelligence specialists, collocated with Headquarters USAREUR at Patrick Henry Kaserne, Heidelberg, Germany, and with field teams stationed with the Joint Interrogation Center [JIC], 513th MI Battalion, Oberursel, Germany, and in Berlin. While they varied in size, the 13 TO&E technical intelligence detachments were small units; a typical unit, the 81st Ordnance Detachment (TI), consisted of one each O-3, E-9, E-7, E-5, and E-4.
Lt Naylor had started his career in technical intelligence in September 1964 with -- HHC, 519th MI Battalion, Ft. Bragg, NC w/ duty as Tech Intel Coordinator, IPD, CONTIC (Continental Army Command Tactical Intel Center) until November 1965.
The Dominican Republic Crisis
Latin America and the Caribbean region felt the full brunt of the Cold War as the U.S. and Soviets maneuvered for position. The U.S. found itself responding to the threat of Communist-Castro like revolutions throughout the hemisphere. Resentment resulting from "indirect" U.S. intervention was mounting throughout the region, particularly after the CIA sponsored coup in Guatemala. President Eisenhower recognized that there must have been deeper reasons for such resentment and sent his brother Milton on a fact-finding mission to the region. The President charged his brother to provide "specific recommendations for improvement in Latin American-United States relations."
An outcome of Milton Eisenhower’s trip to Latin America was the establishment of Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The IDB went into operation in 1959 with $1 billion available for development projects. Perhaps without intent, Milton Eisenhower contributed not only to development efforts in Latin America but to new policy towards the region. "United States foreign policy thus took on a more complex character with concern for development issues now begging to compete with containment as the official response to revolutionary change in Latin America."
President John F. Kennedy also expressed concern over Communist expansion and took no comfort in Nikita Khrushchev's claim that the Soviet's advocated "'wars of national liberation' in Asia, Africa and Latin America. President Kennedy quickly acknowledged the potential development policies in the fight against Communism and understood that Latin America was ripe for Castro like revolutions.
The Kennedy Administration was perhaps the first administration to establish a two tracked approach to containment. Economic and social development, The Alliance for Progress traveled on the first track while military assistance and counterinsurgency training traveled on the second track. The "Alliance" was based on the simple philosophy that if the quality of life was better and life itself more enjoyable, there would be no need for revolutions. This initiative was intended to assist Latin American countries to develop economically and thereby eliminate the need for revolutions. The Dominican Republic was a top priority.
While speaking about the Dominican Republic President Kennedy noted,
"There are three possibilities in descending order of preference, a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third."
Sometime later President Kennedy expressed confidence in the prospects of turning the Dominican Republic into a 'showcase of democracy' under the Alliance for Progress.
The assassination of President Kennedy brought Vice-president Johnson, who was not sympathetic to Latin Americans, to the Oval Office. This was evident by his decision to turn over management of the Alliance for Progress to Thomas Mann. Mann strongly advocated U.S. business interests in Latin America and did not hold Latin Americans in high esteem. He stated "I know my Latinos. They understand only two things, a buck in the pocket and a kick in the ass."
Under the Johnson Administration the Alliance for Progress soon withered away. Johnson was consumed with the Vietnam War and did not want to concentrate on Latin America. The Johnson Administration "never fully shared this idealism with respect to Latin America, and U.S. officials ceased to press for it during his administration." President Johnson went beyond simply bridling the United States’ commitment to the "Alliance"; he increased the use of military forces in suppressing "communist" revolutions and would shortly nullify the Good Neighbor Policy.
On 28 April 1965, U.S. military forces found themselves in the Dominican Republic protecting U.S. interests for the fourth time in 58 years. Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy and the actions of three U.S. administrations (Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson respectively) resulted in the eruption of hostilities in the Dominican Republic in April 1965.
The Johnson Administration's unilateral decision to invade the Dominican Republic was based on erroneous information and the President's own concerns over the possibility of "another Cuba" in the hemisphere and the residual effect that it would have on U.S. efforts in Vietnam.
U.S. military forces deployed to the Dominican Republic under the false pretense of "protecting American lives." Eventually the true reason for this invasion, fear of Communism was uncovered. The consequences of this deceit were a rift between the Administration, the American media as well as the American people. Furthermore, the Johnson Administration managed to agitate Latin American leaders and reinforce the notion of U.S. imperialism by disregarding the Good Neighbor Policy and reverting to the Roosevelt Corollary.
Despite the costs, the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic did produce some benefits. The Organization of American States (OAS) illustrated its ability to function as a multi-national body and democratic rule was eventually attained.
SGM Wayne Van Dyke was a MSG at Ft. Bragg , where he taught Lt. Naylor everything a green 2LT needed to know, and later in Germany where he was SGM of the 81st Ordnance Detachment (TI), which Lt. Naylor commanded. During the Dominican Republic crisis when he and Lt. Naylor were scheduled to deploy and were getting in the jeep to go get on the plane at Pope AFB when the commander on the ground in Dominican Republic said "I've got too many spooks here -- don't send anymore." So we were cancelled but we handled all the captured weapons and equipment from Dominican Republic. There were several interesting incidents in getting certain items from Ft. Bragg to Washington for Secretary of Defense briefings.
The 519th was alerted for service in Vietnam and Lt. Naylor served in Vietnam from Nov 1965 until Apr 1966 with the TID, 519th MI Battalion, with duty at CMEC, Saigon/Tan Son Nhut AFB, and helped MAJ John Baker set up CMEC and was chief of the first team to deploy to the field. From April 1966 until Oct 1966 he was the first CMEC Field team to deploy to the field. This was CMEC TM 1 Chief, Adv Tm 1, located in Danang, Vietnam. He departed Vietnam and arrived in Germany to find out that he had been promoted during his leave and travel; one of the first things he remembered about his time in the UTIC was being promoted to CPT by MAJ Tittel.
Back in Europe
During the period December 1966 -May 1968, the CO of UTIC was MAJ, later LTC Alfred Tittel; the XO, probably from sometime in 1967, was LTC Henry Nachtsheim. I can’t recall the name of the Sergeant Major; but the secretary, Joyce, was the wife of a USAREUR enlisted man; she had a penchant for very short skirts and tight clothing. From December 1966 the Operations Officer was CPT Robert H. Naylor II; Operations Sergeant was SFC or MSG Morrales; and the Operations Clerk was SP4 Bailey. Sometime in late 1967 or early 1968 a new Operations Officer arrived and CPT Naylor became head of the Combat Material Section.
MAJ Robert Westerfeld headed the Missiles and Rockets Section. LT Frank Holland was in the Medical Section; CPT Sweeney was in the Quartermaster Section; and LT Richard Ashby, who spoke fluent Russian, was in the Engineer Section; and LT Jerry Owens in the Signal Section. LT Mike Jarvis was a UTIC representative in Berlin.
SGM Wayne Van Dyke, from the 81st Ordnance Detachment (TI) and SFC Cartwright, from the signal detachment, were posted with the Joint Interrogation Center [JIC] at Oberursel. SGM Roy Bryan, Transportation Section, was in Heidelberg, as was SGM Levine of the Chemical Section. SP Orgazalek, an extremely talented artist formerly with General Motors body design, did wonders in identifying Soviet Bloc vehicles covered with tarpaulins, which was referred to as “tarpology intelligence.” Among the civilians at UTIC, who GS-12s to GS-14s, where Dr. Arthur G. Volz, who had been in Germany since before the end of World War II, and Peter Bratt.
Weekly secure teletype conferences, projected on a screen in a secure briefing room, were held with Mr. L. Craig Burden of the Foreign Science and Technology Center in Washington, DC and other analysts. UTIC also worked closely with the Foreign Technical Intelligence Office at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
The UTIC produced a series of books designed to assist the soldiers in the field – all except a couple were unclassified and designed to fit in the pocket of a field jacket. The most widely used and distributed was called the “Red Book,” after the color of its cover. It covered Soviet Bloc weapons and was very popular with the troops. Eventually it became so comprehensive that it had to be divided into two volumes. In addition to the manuals on Soviet ordnance, they produced manuals on Engineer Equipment (Tan Books), Chemical Warfare Equipment (Blue book) and a classified book on signal Equipment (Green book)
Soviet Ordnance material
The major concern of the NATO Military was the possibility of a Warsaw Pact attack across central Europe, the so called “Fulda Gap Syndrome” which envisioned large numbers of Russian tanks rapidly advancing through the Fulda Gap and into central Germany. At the end of WW II the main tank in the Soviet arsenal was the T 34/85. This tank was replaced by the T 54 and later versions, the T 55.
The layout of the T-54 tank is conventional, with the main armament comprising a 100mm rifled gun. The T-54 has been used more than any other tank since the Second World War. It is intended for combat actions involving tanks, combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers and other armored enemy targets. The T-55 combines a high velocity gun with exceptional long-range endurance. The T-55 has a fully tracked, five-road-wheeled chassis with a low-silhouetted hull and a dome shaped turret.
The T-54 series tanks first appeared in 1949 as replacements for the T-34 tank of World War II. The first T-54 prototype was completed in 1946 with first production beginning in 1947. The T-54 was continuously improved and modified, and, when sufficient changes had been made, the tank was redesignated T-55. The T-55 was introduced in 1958 and incorporates all the refinements and improvements of the fully developed T-54 series without being radically different in design or appearance. The T-55A appeared in the early 1960s. Production continued in the Soviet Union through 1981 and was also undertaken in China (as the Type 59), Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Usually our first indication of a new weapon in the Soviet arsenal is in a publication such as a military magazine. Sometimes a newspaper article provides a clue. In the clandestine world of espionage, information may come from a spy. One such was Pyotr Semyonovich Popov who was a major with Soviet military intelligence (GRU) when he contacted American intelligence in Vienna in 1953 and offered his services as a spy for the United States. Popov was arrested by the Soviets in 1958. During the period when he was working for the United States, he was "the CIA's most important agent." Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 213-214.
In many cases the various Military parades held in Moscow’s Red Square would be our first knowledge of a new weapon system. Military Attaches take many pictures at these parades and all pictures end up in some sort of Intelligence report. Actually getting possession of an item of Soviet block Ordnance was an almost impossible task in peace time. The occasional defector did provide a source of information for our technical intelligence effort.
On November 4, 1956, Soviet forces launched a major attack on Hungary aimed at crushing, once and for all, the spontaneous national uprising that had begun 12 days earlier. At 5:20 a.m., Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy announced the invasion to the nation in a grim, 35-second broadcast, declaring: "Our troops are fighting. The Government is in its place." However, within hours Nagy himself would seek asylum at the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest while his former colleague and imminent replacement, János Kádár, who had been flown secretly from Moscow to the city of Szolnok, 60 miles southeast of the capital, prepared to take power with Moscow's backing. On November 22, after receiving assurances of safe passage from Kádár and the Soviets, Nagy finally agreed to leave the Yugoslav Embassy. But he was immediately arrested by Soviet security officers and flown to a secret location in Romania. By then, the fighting had mostly ended, the Hungarian resistance had essentially been destroyed, and Kádár was entering the next phase of his strategy to neutralize dissent for the long term. The defeat of the Hungarian revolution was one of the darkest moments of the cold war.
LTC Naylor said that when he was at UTIC, they were told that a bloc officer was going to deliver a tank [believe it was a T-54B] to us for an undisclosed amount of cash, asylum, etc. I seem to remember it was coming from Hungary but am not sure. It would come across, be loaded on a flat car, and hauled away immediately for analysis. I was still Ops Off at UTIC at the time and had to find a place for it to go. I found a warehouse with an operable rail line leading into it in Mannheim. I arranged to rent the warehouse, and for having it cordoned off and declared a Restricted Area. , I got an MP unit assigned to provide armed physical security 24-7 and was all set for people from FTIO, etc. to come and make initial evaluations. However, something fell through and the tank never came.
One incident occurred when a Soviet T 54 tank crewman defected across the border and brought with him a 100mm main gun round. John Baker was told a story by a veteran of the 81st OD (TI) [Sgt Hamilton]. He stated that the TI people actually had a "dragon wagon" standing by, at the border with Hungary but that the politicians would not allow the T-54 to be driven across the border.
Sputnik and The Dawn of the Space Age
History changed on October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik I. The world's first artificial satellite was about the size of a basketball, weighed only 183 pounds, and took about 98 minutes to orbit the Earth on its elliptical path. That launch ushered in new political, military, technological, and scientific developments. While the Sputnik launch was a single event, it marked the start of the space age and the U.S.-U.S.S.R space race.
The story begins in 1952, when the International Council of Scientific Unions decided to establish July 1, 1957, to December 31, 1958, as the International Geophysical Year (IGY) because the scientists knew that the cycles of solar activity would be at a high point then. In October 1954, the council adopted a resolution calling for artificial satellites to be launched during the IGY to map the Earth's surface. In July 1955, the White House announced plans to launch an Earth-orbiting satellite for the IGY and solicited proposals from various Government research agencies to undertake development. In September 1955, the Naval Research Laboratory's Vanguard proposal was chosen to represent the U.S. during the IGY.
The Sputnik launch changed everything. As a technical achievement, Sputnik caught the world's attention and the American public off-guard. Its size was more impressive than Vanguard's intended 3.5-pound payload. In addition, the public feared that the Soviets' ability to launch satellites also translated into the capability to launch ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear weapons from Europe to the U.S. Then the Soviets struck again; on November 3, Sputnik II was launched, carrying a much heavier payload, including a dog named Laika.
Immediately after the Sputnik I launch in October, the U.S. Defense Department responded to the political furor by approving funding for another U.S. satellite project. As a simultaneous alternative to Vanguard, Wernher von Braun and his Army Redstone Arsenal team began work on the Explorer project. This was of course, the aftermath of Project paperclip.
On January 31, 1958, the tide changed, when the United States successfully launched Explorer I. This satellite carried a small scientific payload that eventually discovered the magnetic radiation belts around the Earth, named after principal investigator James Van Allen. A co-worker of Van Allen, was Hans Bomke, another German scientist of the WW II era.
The Explorer program continued as a successful ongoing series of lightweight, scientifically useful spacecraft. The Sputnik launch also led directly to the creation of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In July 1958, Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act (commonly called the "Space Act"), which created NASA as of October 1, 1958 from the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) and other government agencies. It also led to the creation of ARPA, designed so that the US would not overlook promising new technologies.
ARPA-DARPA: DARPA Over the Years
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was established in 1958 as the first U.S. response to the Soviet launching of Sputnik. Since that time DARPA's mission has been to assure that the U.S. maintains a lead in applying state-of-the-art technology for military capabilities and to prevent technological surprise from her adversaries. The DARPA organization was as unique as its role, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense and operating in coordination with, but completely independent of, the military research and development (R&D) establishment. Strong support from the senior DoD management has always been essential since DARPA was designed to be an anathema to the conventional military and R&D structure and, in fact, to be a deliberate counterpoint to traditional thinking and approaches.
Some of the more important founding characteristics are listed below. Over the years, DARPA has continued to adhere to these founding principles:
Small and flexible;Flat organization;Substantial autonomy and freedom from bureaucratic impediments;Technical staff drawn from world-class scientists and engineers with representation from industry, universities, government laboratories and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers;Technical staff assigned for 3-5 years and rotated to assure fresh thinking and perspectives;Project based -- all efforts typically 3-5 years long with strong focus on end-goals. Major technological challenges may be addressed over much longer times but only as a series of focused steps. The end of each project is the end. It may be that another project is started in the same technical area, perhaps with the same program manager and, to the outside world, this may be seen as a simple extension. For DARPA, though, it is a conscious weighing of the current opportunity and a completely fresh decision. The fact of prior investment is irrelevant;Necessary supporting personnel (technical, contracting, administrative) are "hired" on a temporary basis to provide complete flexibility to get into and out of an area without the problems of sustaining the staff. This is by agreement with Defense or other governmental organizations (military R&D groups, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, etc.) and from System Engineering and Technical Assistance (SETA) contractors;Program Managers (the heart of DARPA) are selected to be technically outstanding and entrepreneurial. The best DARPA Program Managers have always been freewheeling zealots in pursuit of their goals;Management is focused on good stewardship of taxpayer funds but imposes little else in terms of rules. Management's job is to enable the Program Managers;A complete acceptance of failure if the payoff of success was high enough.The Agency looks very similar today. The principal exception is its reporting chain -- whereas initially DARPA reported to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, it later came under the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) (current equivalent is Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)) and more recently under the Director for Defense Research and Engineering.
Other than the reporting chain, there have been only minor changes in approach. Each Director recognized the wisdom of the agency's historical approach and defended the organization from outside influences that would constrain its freedom and flexibility. In addition, the Department of Defense's senior management, seeing the value of an agile, forward-looking R&D group unconstrained by conventional thinking and able to investigate ideas and approaches that the traditional R&D community finds too outlandish or risky, has consistently protected the independence of DARPA. Failure to keep the bureaucracy at bay would have doomed the value of DARPA and this has been consistently recognized over the years.
The freedom to act quickly and decisively with high-quality people has paid handsome dividends for DoD in terms of revolutionary military capabilities.
Today, DARPA is an organization of 240 personnel (approximately 140 of which are technical) directly managing a budget of about $2 billion. A typical technical project might be structured as follows:
$10-40 million over 4 years;Single DARPA Program Manager with direct control of the efforts and the funding;A SETA contractor or contractors to support the Program Manager in his or her primary roles of managing the efforts and representing the program with Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military Services and/or involved Unified Commander;An Agent (furnishing from a fraction of a person to several people) in a military R&D laboratory to provide technical and contracting support (paid from program funds to provide this support);Five to 10 contractor organizations and two universities executing tasks focused on a specific aggregate goal.Obviously, there are wide variations to this "typical" case. Some projects are under $1 million and a few are in the hundreds of millions of dollars. However, the management paradigm is the same; the variation is in the amount and type of "hired" assistance. Even in larger programs, the emphasis is on small teams of the highest quality people. Regardless of size, a single DARPA Program Manager is in charge and must manage and represent the project internally and externally.
DARPA's original operating philosophy has changed over the years in only three ways -- its relationships with the commercial marketplace, its business practices, and its emphasis on joint systems.
First, the DoD has gone from dominating the market in such areas as microelectronics, computing and network communications, each of which was driven by DARPA in past years, to the current situation where the DoD is able to somewhat influence the directions of a much-larger-than-DoD market. DARPA has played one of the key roles in assuring that DoD's long-term interests are served in this new situation.
Second, in the past decade, DARPA has pioneered revolutionary R&D business practices reform. With the support of the Congress and DoD senior management, DARPA has led the way in adopting commercial practices and innovative contracting arrangements. Congress provided the authority for "Other Transactions" and "Section 845" agreements to DARPA on an experimental basis, and, because of DARPA's success, has now conveyed the same authorities to the rest of DoD.
Third, since the Goldwater-Nicholls Act, DARPA has focused considerable attention on solutions to joint-Service systems and problems.
In summary, DARPA's ability to adapt rapidly to changing environments and to seek and embrace opportunities in both technology and in processes, while maintaining the historically proven principles of the Agency, makes DARPA the crown jewel in Defense R&D and a unique R&D organization in the world.
ARPA - DoD directive 5105.15 establishing the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was signed on February 7, 1958. The directive gave ARPA the responsibility "for the direction or performance of such advanced projects in the field of research and development as the Secretary of Defense shall, from time to time, designate by individual project or by category."
DARPA - On March 23, 1972, by DoD Directive, the name was changed to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPA was established as a separate defense agency under the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
ARPA - On February 22, 1993, DARPA was redesignated the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) -- as the agency was known before 1972. The change was outlined in President Bill Clinton's strategy paper, "Technology for America's Economic Growth, A New Direction to Build Economic Strength."
DARPA - On February 10, 1996, Public Law 104-106, under Title IX of the Fiscal Year 1996 Defense Authorization Act, directed an organizational name change to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
The Defense Intelligence Agency DIA
By the late 1950’s it was realized that the CIA was not providing the type of information needed by the military forces. As a result, the Defense Intelligence Agency was established.
Established in 1961, DIA’s mission is to provide timely and objective military intelligence to war-fighters, policymakers, and force planners. The Director of the Agency is the primary adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military intelligence matters. Under the auspices of the Military Intelligence Board, DIA unites the Defense Intelligence Community on major issues dealing with support to deployed forces, assessments, policy, and resources. In addition, to assist weapon systems planners and the Defense acquisition community, DIA plays a key role in providing intelligence on foreign weapon systems.
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was one manifestation of the trend toward centralization that began in the Eisenhower administration and continued into the Kennedy administration and beyond. The Eisenhower administration, based on the recommendations of the Joint Study Group, concluded in the late 1950s that a consolidation of the military services' general intelligence activities (defined as all non-SIGINT, non-overhead, non-organic intelligence activities) was needed.
Robert McNamara, President Kennedy's secretary of defense, initially proposed a more drastic centralization, in the form of an organization that would take over military service intelligence and counterintelligence operations and possibly those of the National Security Agency. The agency McNamara envisioned would report directly to the secretary of defense.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had a somewhat different vision, and the DIA that was established on 1 August 1961 and reported to the secretary of defense through the JCS. Since its creation, DIA's primary responsibilities have been producing strategic military intelligence, and supervising the scientific and technical intelligence production activities of the military service scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence centers.
DIA intelligence studies focus, inter alia, on foreign weapons systems, strategies, command and control capabilities, and military technologies. In 1964, DIA assumed responsibility for the military attaches previously operated by the individual services; it now runs Defense Attache Offices in more than 90 countries. The responsibilities of the attaches include open source collection of data and, on occasion, clandestine collection.
In 1991, DIA absorbed two intelligence units that had originally been under the control of the army. The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIQ was established in 1982, replacing the Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency (AMIIA), which had provided medical intelligence to the entire defense community. Such intelligence is vital for planning combat operations where the environment and prevalence of diseases differ markedly from those in the United States.
One aspect of AFMIC activities consists of producing general medical intelligence — on health and sanitation, epidemiology, environmental factors, and military and civilian medical care capabilities. A second aspect is the production of medical, scientific, and technical intelligence concerning all basic and applied biomedical phenomena of military importance, including biological, chemical, psychological, and biophysical factors.
Also placed under DIA control in 1991 was the then-Army Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC). MSIC traces its origins back to the Special Security Office of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, established in June 1956. After a variety of name changes and increases in status, it became the Missile Intelligence Agency in 1970, and in 1985, the Army Missile and Space Intelligence Center. The center's mission was to produce intelligence on foreign missile and space systems which could affect the army's mission. Thus, it produced intelligence on short-range ballistic missiles, antitank guided missiles, tactical air defense, strategic ballistic missile defense, and strategic air defenses.
The Foreign Science and Technology Center was established in 1962 from the consolidation of the intelligence offices of the individual army technical services (among them Signal, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Engineer, and Chemical Services). FSTC was responsible for predicting foreign military research, development, and acquisition trends as they affected the U.S. Army; producing all-source reports on foreign science and technology; and analyzing foreign technology and weapons systems (or components of weapons systems) acquired by the United States.
The UTIC medical component was the 131st Medical Detachment (Intel) which was actually subordinate to the 9th Hospital Center, HQ, USAREUR, unlike the other technical service intelligence detachments which appear to have been directly subordinate to UTIC and the USAREUR G-2. The medical unit was located at Nachricten Kaserne, 130th Station Hospital, Heidelberg. This may have been before UTIC became functional. This may have been true, before UTIC but might be misleading. When I was at UTIC, the 131st personnel were at HQ USAREUR [at least 1LT Holland and, I believe, the SGM of the unit]; some may have been at Camp King or in Berlin as was the case in some of the other TI units. The 1967 stationing lists show the 131st at Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg. Units were not really located where the stationing list showed them, i.e., the 81st Ordnance Detachment (TI) [me at Heidelberg, Van Dyke at Cp King]. Probably the 131st was subordinate to the 9th Hosp Center for "supervision" although its personnel were NOT at the 9th but with UTIC.
Units Composing UTIC
Units stationed at Campbell Barracks, HQ USAREUR, Heidelberg:
48th Chem Det (TI)
82nd Ord Det (TI)
91st Ord Det (TIC) MAJ Robert Westerfeld
131st Med Det (I) 1LT Frank Holland
326th Sig Det (I) SFC Cartwright
501st Eng Det (TIR)
561st Eng Det (TIR) 1LT Richard Ashby (believe this correct although he may have been 560th)
562nd Trans Det (IR) SGM Roy Bryan
Units stationed at Camp King, JIC 513th MI Gp, Oberursal (but part of UTIC with personnel in Heidelberg):
19th Chem Det (TI)
81st Ord Det (TI) CPT Robert Naylor SGM Wayne Van Dyke
132nd Med Det (I)
560th Eng Det (TIC)
Unlocated unit(s):
QM Det (TI) CPT Frank Sweeney
Unit(s) with unsure association:
80th Ord Det (TI) – Coleman Barracks, Mannheim
Misc. facts:
1LT Sorensen/Sorenson was CO of one of the Chemical Dets.
SGM Levine was with one of the Chem Dets .
Both Med Dets were under TO&E 08-500D65.
All Ord Dets were under TO&E 09-500D62 and the 326th Sig Det was under TO&E 11-500D62.
MAJ Thomas Woodall, CE, was CO of one of the Eng Dets and replaced Capt. Naylor as Ops Off for UTIC in 1967. I believe his middle initial was "J."
One day, needing some photos of some new Soviet Bloc weapons, CPT Naylor had a number of the UTIC personnel dress in captured Soviet and East German uniforms, equipped them with the Soviet Bloc weapons, and marched them to a nearby civilian park, where a photographer took photos. Marching the men back, an MP at the gate to Headquarters USAREUR, stopped CPT Naylor, the only person in an American Army uniform, and asked him if these were friendly troops. CPT Naylor assured him they were, and pointed out LT Ashby, dressed in a Russian Major’s uniform, and informed the MP that this man was a Major. The MP came to attention, saluted, and waved the formation onto base.. So much for the “Know Your Enemy Program!”
I know that the USMLM in Berlin helped TI in several ways. Three examples: (1) Their teams infiltrated Soviet and E. Ger. maneuver areas and spent nights hiding in bushes, etc. -- This is how we got knowledge of how good the Soviet bridging equipment was and how short the time for them to cross a major river was. This changed our defense planning a lot -- USAREUR and 7th Army had counted on the rivers providing much needed time to organize defense lines in case of an attack and that all had to be redone. That was the basis for 1LT Ashby's "Soviet River Cross Threat" briefing that I mentioned in an earlier e-mail. (2) Their teams also snuck into rail yards where the Soviets and E. Germans were moving vehicles on RR flatcars. The vehicles were tarp covered. They would take photos of the “tarped” vehicle from several angles, then try to ascertain what type of vehicle was under the tarp. They also stoles tarps, or cut samples from tarps. All this went to UTIC where a comprehensive, and I believe classified, 30-60 series pamphlet with restricted distribution was produced by SP Orgazalek and others -- used by many attaches to identify tarp covered equipment on flatcars. (3) They did the similar work with signal equipment, especially antennas of all types. Am sure they watched and reported on infantry, armor, artillery, chemical, etc. training whenever they could. We benefited from all the data they got. Not sure anymore where they came from but we had most of the bloc weapons at UTIC -- usually fairly shortly after they were discovered. There were a few we did not have so used photos from bloc publications or USMLM for the 30-60 series.
When I was in Vietnam from September 1967 until August 1968, these USAREUR booklets were very valuable in providing an unclassified source of information on Soviet weapons development and a guide to what we could expect the North Vietnamese army to introduce to the conflict.
The Soviet Army had developed a river crossing capability which far outstripped Allied capabilities and which greatly reduced the Allied defense delaying time in the case of a Soviet attack. This, of course, greatly worried USAREUR and UTIC was ordered to develop a classified briefing to be given to selected commanders and staffs, and an unclassified version to be given to the troops themselves. Richard Ashby, probably a CPT by then, went to V Corps Headquarters to give the classified briefing. He came on stage dressed in his Russian Major’s uniform, and began speaking in Russian. He then halted, and in heavily accented English, said “Oh, I am sorry. I forgot that the Americans do not learn to speak their enemy’s language so I will have to continue in my poor English.” He gave the rest of the briefing in less accented English. When the briefing was finished, he was asked to visit the V Corps G-2. He got almost all the way through the secure G-2 facility before anyone realized that there was apparently a Russian Major in with the classified maps, charts, etc. During a later investigation, an attempt was made to place the blame for the V Corps security failure on CPT Ashby but he was exonerated.
After arriving in Heidelberg and while awaiting the arrival of his family, CPT Naylor had a lot of free time in the evenings and on weekends. Much of this time was spent perusing Soviet military magazines and translations of articles found in them. CPT Naylor noted several blurry photos of troops armed with what appeared to be a new weapon. After coupling this with an article by the Bullet Master of the Soviet Army, which mentioned that the barrel of the new sniper rifle needed to be cleaned differently than an AK, and after finding a couple more blurry pictures, CPT Naylor was able to make the first Allied identification and sketch of the Soviet SVD Dragoonov Sniper Rifle.
SVD was designed not as a standard sniper rifle. In fact, main role of the SVD in the Soviet / Russian Army is to extend effective range of fire of every infantry squad up to 600 meters and to provide special fire support. The SVD is a lightweight and quite accurate (for it's class) rifle, capable of semi-auto fire. First request for new sniper rifle was issued in 1958. In 1963 SVD (Snaiperskaya Vintovka Dragunova, or Dragunov Sniper Rifle) was accepted by Soviet Military. SVD can use any kind of standard 7.62x54R ammo, but the primary round is specially developed for SVD sniper-grade cartridge with steel-core bullet. Every infantry squad in the Russian (Soviet) army had one man with SVD. The SVD is extremely reliable in all conditions, and designed for heavy battles. It has backup adjustable iron sights as a standard option, as well as a bayonet mount (standard AK-47 bayonet type).
At Headquarters USAREUR there was a Sergeants Major Council, consisting of all the Sergeants Major at the headquarters, which dealt with enlisted and NCO matters and controlled the various coffee messes. In late 1967 or early 1968, someone finally realized that UTIC, with 13 voting Sergeants Major, virtually controlled all decisions the council made. Shortly thereafter the policies of the council were amended and TD units, such as UTIC, were thereafter limited to only one vote.
As might be expected, the various TO&E units had an eclectic collection of vehicles. The 81st Ordnance Detachment (TI) was authorized a 1/4 ton jeep and a 3/4 ton truck – a very old truck. At one time it had a fording kit, but his had been removed a long time ago. However, there was still a hole and a mounting plate on the dashboard where the engaging mechanism had been. For some time a brass doorknob had been mounted on a shaft to fill the hole. While totally unauthorized, it was never a problem at inspection time – as long it was kept shined. The 326th Signal Detachment (TI) was authorized a new, 2½ ton, electronic shop van. The controlling authorities refused to issue the signal gear for the van. When there were field exercises with USAREUR and VII Corps, UTIC personnel would claim the van was full of classified electronic gear, park it in the intelligence area, surround it with barbed wire and “Secure Area – No Entry” signs. Actually, inside were folding cots and a field stove, allowing UTIC analysts to avoid “hot bunking” in the noisy and smelly billeting tents.
During the 1967 Mid-East War, a small team from UTIC, to include CPT Naylor and Dr. Volz [and probably MAJ Westerfeld] was set to deploy, in civilian clothing, to examine material the Israeli Army had captured. However, due to political ramifications, it was decided to send only civilian personnel, primarily from CONUS, although I believe Dr. Volz may have gone also.
The Last casualty of the cold war, Major Arthur Nicholson
On March 24, 1985, which was a Sunday, Nicholson headed into East Germany with his driver, Army Staff Sergeant Jessie Schatz. As members of the USMLM, Nicholson and Schatz were basically licensed spies. Their organization was a holdover from the Second World War, when the Allies assigned representatives to work with each other in Germany’s various zones of occupation as Hitler’s minions disarmed. These special liaison units did not disband with the onset of the Cold War. Instead, they were given something of a carte blanche to roam around the countryside and observe military activity. The Americans, British, and French had soldiers assigned to East Germany, and the Soviets had teams tasked to West Germany.
This awkward arrangement remained in place because both sides found it a useful way of collecting information on the opposition’s troop movements and military hardware. Yet there were enormous tensions, and these always carried the potential of deadly violence.
Sometime in the afternoon, Nicholson and Schatz followed a convoy of Soviet tanks returning from target practice. It was a typical USMLM activity. Nicholson was probably counting the tanks and studying their exteriors. A little while later, the Americans broke off and approached a tank shed. They thought they were alone. The USMLM’s 1985 unit history describes the scene and what happened next:
This facility served the Independent Tank Regiment of 2 Guards Tank Army. Known to be frequently guarded under normal conditions, it had a varied history of occasionally violent reaction. Thus, the tour [i.e., Nicholson and Schatz] entered the area with considerable caution, stopping in the forest to watch and listen at intervals as they did so. SSG Schatz, who had just visited the area a few days prior pointed out an area which had been recently occupied, but the Soviets had departed it. The tour then approached the sheds, photographed signboards displayed nearby, and positioned the vehicle to permit the tour NCO [Schatz] to pull security while the tour officer [Nicholson] checked for armor.
Unbeknownst to the tour, and despite its best efforts at observation, a sentry remained undetected, concealed in the adjacent woods. According to information obtained later, he had been walking near his post on the far side of the sheds as the tour approached. Hearing the vehicle, the Soviet soldier made his way through the flank of the range to a position about 50 meters behind the tour; SSG Schatz noticed him just before he opened fire. The Soviets claim that the sentry issued a challenge in two languages (Russian and German), fired a warning shot into the air, then shot to disable. This is simply not true. SSG Schatz, a native German, heard no challenge in any language. The sentry’s first shot whizzed narrowly over the heads of the tour; it was not a warning, but a miss. And one of the two remaining rounds struck MAJ Nicholson, by this time running back to the tour vehicle, near his center of mass: the upper abdomen. SSG Schatz shouted a warning as the first shot resounded — too late to help. He then slammed the hatch shut, started the car, and threw it into reverse to reach MAJ Nicholson. Hit by one of the shots, Nicholson groaned, fell, called to Schatz, and promptly lost consciousness. The tour NCO sprang from the vehicle to administer first aid, but the sentry refused to permit him to do so. Using sign language, SSG Schatz communicated his intent to the Soviet and took a step toward the fallen officer. The sentry, who had held Schatz at gunpoint the entire time, then shouldered his AK-47, took aim at Schatz’s head, and motioned him back to the vehicle. Seeing the futility of further action and the hopelessness of the situation, SSG Schatz complied. He secured and covered the tour equipment, check to be sure the doors were locked, and waited. Shock set in quickly. ...
Over the next three hours many Soviet officers and soldiers arrived to secure the area, collect data, and investigate the situation; considerable confusion reigned. Yet no one, including the obvious medical personnel, rendered even rudimentary first aid. Finally at 1605A (one hour, 5 minutes after the shooting) an unidentified individual in a blue jogging suit took MAJ Nicholson’s pulse, which had ceased. The protracted failure to provide or even permit any medical attention at all ensured that the wound proved fatal.
An international furor ensued, as the Americans and Soviets traded accusations. The United States demanded an apology and compensation for Nicholson’s wife; the USSR claimed, outrageously, that Schatz had refused to leave his car to help his companion. After a while, the controversy subsided and the Cold War plodded on for a few more years.
One thing is not in dispute: Arthur Nicholson fell a hero, the last American casualty of the Cold War. “Nick did not want to die, and we did not want to lose him,” said his widow. “But I know that he would lay down his life again for America.”
