Technical Intelligence Bulletins Sept

The Mobile Parts Hospital gets input via drawings in electronic format, or an existing part is scanned by laser. The reproduced part is fabricated from powdered feed stocks, either plastics or metals, using a sintering-type process. There is no conventional machining involved; the replacement part is produced to net shape. We once sent them a Mills Bomb, as an example of a complex component needing to be reproduced from the actual component. I'm told the repro they sent us was excellent. Unfortunately I was on leave when it came back, and my idiot boss gave it to someone else, so I never got to see it. I do still have the rifle grenade they made for us in nylon from a CAD drawing. Were it not for the cost, this would be an excellent means of fabricating EOD training aids as well as replacement parts. Ed R.

The Army recently discovered flaws in the Stryker's ceramic composite armor and is racing to fix it. The vehicle's remote weapon systems can't be fired accurately on the move, and soldiers must get out of the vehicle to reload, exposing them to enemy fire. Each vehicle is covered with 132 plates designed to protect against up to 14.5-mm fire, slightly bigger than a .50-caliber bullet. But a subcontractor hired to provide the armor apparently deviated from the standards and at least one variation failed in a test firing, Army officials said.

The full extent of the plate problem is unknown, but it's serious enough that the Army has launched a top-priority test of all plates at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, with replacement tiles expected to be put on the brigade's vehicles later this month. The Stryker brigade also is heading off to Iraq without a separate outer layer of plates designed to protect against rocket-propelled grenades, which insurgents have used again and again to deadly effect against U.S. troops in Iraq. These plates are not scheduled to be ready for use until sometime next year. So the Army is installing an interim system - a steel cage that surrounds the sides of the vehicle. It's designed to explode grenades away from the vehicle. But the armor is far from perfect protection. An initial rocket-propelled grenade, for example, could destroy the armor, exposing the two-member crew and up to nine soldiers riding inside to deadly fire.

General Shinseki, shortly after becoming Chief of Staff of the Army in 1999, argued that the Heavy Force (tanks and Bradleys) was too heavy and cumbersome to deploy quickly, the Light Force (Airborne and Light Infantry) was too light to be effective once it arrived, and so a highly deployable interim armored mid weight force was needed to for global intervention until the new advanced technology Objective Force, featuring the Future Combat System was fielded.

He could in fact have fielded a C-130 deployable global expeditionary force at minimal expense, within a very short time, by using upgraded tracked M113 armored personnel carriers, the M8 Armored Gun, and other existing equipment, but instead chose to field the wheeled Stryker, a vehicle that was completely new to the Army, at least partially because he wanted to make a gesture that real change was on the way. In fact the US Army commanding general in Europe had already established a rapid reaction force built around the M113 and had deployed it for peace enforcement operations.

Worse, no effort was made by the CSA to change his vision after 911 even when subsequent events made it very clear that this country was now in for a long war against terrorism; and might well also be faced with serious conventional conflicts in countries such as Iran, Syria and North Korea. In short, we needed, and need, globally deployable warfighting rather peace-keeping capabilities. Warfighting capabilities can keep the peace but the

Current events demonstrate dramatically that it can be very hard to tell when and where warfighting stops and peacekeeping starts. It is the premise of this writer, and this report, that our focus should be on warfighting and that General Shinseki's choice of the Stryker, with its high capital and operating costs, and limited capabilities, was wrong.

The problem arose last winter when the Germany firm I.B.D., which makes the ceramic armor called Mexus 2, changed the way it manufactured the tiles, but did not tell the Army. The change meant the company was sending different types of tiles that had not been certified as bullet-resistant by the Army.

Further tests and X-rays this summer confirmed the abnormality. Army officials told The Washington Times last week the tiles are of a "nonstandard confirmation" in three areas: ceramic ingredients were changed by I.B.D.; the sizes of some tiles differ from the original design and/or, a manufacturer was chosen by I.B.D. without prior approval by General Dynamics Corp., the Stryker's prime contractor.

While Army officials told The Times they will not send any vehicles to Iraq until they meet required protection levels, news of the armor problem will surely feed the Stryker's numerous critics. Retired officers and some lawmakers contend the vehicle already is susceptible to rocket-propelled grenades, such as the ones used with deadly effect by Saddam Hussein guerrillas in Iraq.

The Stryker stands as the Army's most important transformation program. It symbolizes an attempt to meet Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's goal of a lighter, quicker-deploying Army to meet 21st century threats. The Pentagon has approved the first four of a planned six Stryker brigades of some 300 vehicles and 3,800 soldiers each. A Stryker brigade is scheduled to make its combat debut in Iraq next month as part of the Army's complex plan to rotate troops in and out of the post-Saddam country.

The Army is subjecting 39 ceramic tiles to machine gun fire. Each tile represents a category of tile that, because of I.B.D. changes, did not meet Army specifications. As of Friday, the Army had tested 11 of the 39, with one getting a failing grade because a round was able to penetrate it.

The Army will fix that side-panel tile by either reinforcing it with a steel plate on each Stryker or replacing it altogether with newer tiles from the I.B.D. assembly line. The Army has shipped steel plates to Fort Lewis, Wash., where the brigade is based, just in case the steel-plate option is chosen.

"This is not a tank," he said. "The mission of this is to carry troops. The alternative to this is troops marching, and people keep forgetting this. This is an infantry carrier vehicle, with variants, to supply support for those troops when they go into battle. The soldiers come out of this vehicle fresh and ready to fight."

The armor problem comes as an author and military consultant is circulating a report in which he asserts that the Stryker has a number of operational shortcomings and that it should not be inserted into a combat zone. Victor O'Reilly, who wrote the report for Rep. James H. Saxton, New Jersey Republican, said the Stryker's wheel wells are particularly vulnerable targets.

I was sent a [picture of a Russian RB radio set with three soldiers manning the set. I sent it to my Russian contact. He made some observations that I thought were interesting. In 1940 during lousey and ashaming Finnish war Stalin was discouraged by very good Finnish automatic guns named "Suomi". He ordered to bring a trophy "Suomi" to him. After "Suomi" was brought and detaily investigated, he invited all the light arms designers and ordered to repeat round BIG CAPACITY Suomi magazine in 24 hours. They tried to persuade Stalin about heaviness, problems with filling and general inconvenience of round magazines, but he stood firmly. So round magazine became the only infantry magazine for auto guns before the war...I do not take in account SVT rifle. During first months of war there were everywhere almost no SMG's with Red Army troops. Only Mosin 1890/1930 rifle in mass and rare SVT rifles. Enough to say in Dec. of 1942 TOTAL smg reserve quantity of Red Army' general staff was only 250 pieces!

Sector-type magazine (curved box) for PPSh was certified by GKO on Feb. 12 , 1942. It contained 35 cartridges. The PPS was first certified by GKO on July 28, 1942. First series of PPS were tested only on Leningrad front. It had a lowered cyclic rate of fire of 600 shots per minute instead of the 1000 of PPS and PPD, has no switch for single shots. Single shooting might be achieved just by short pressings to the trigger. In middle of 1943 PPS was modernized and adopted as PPS-43.

So the present picture may be made since spring or at least fall of 1942, or later (the ushanka - winter cap can be seen on background. Since I notice not a single fallen leaf around the tree, and some tiny forest flowers grow nearby SMG, it may be definitely springtime, more exactly - late April or first part of May month). Guessing on that is early yet cold springtime, and stick magazines are not as prompt by mass delivery from the factory as we would think, it may be spring of 1943.

I could judge that as on the photo all the soldiers were armed with smg's - it meant the regiment should be elitary one if the pix was really made in 1942. May be NKVD troops. If the date is later - 1943 and 1944 it may be any regiment. I can only say the RB radio should hardly survive till 1944 during real continuous battle circumstances... New radios were supplied to the troops...

Since RB radio looks like new one, no wiped paint etc., the journalist (the photo was made professionally!) was working for big press, may be for PRAVDA newspaper. It was NOT an occasional photo made by an officer or soldier of the same regiment. The hi-class front journalists were usually being sent to best regiments - well armed and otherwise more-less fully equipped (radios were also rare things), and only such photos were being allowed by NKVD censor to print in mass media.

Last Updated Wed, 10 Sep 2003 7:17:30 SACRAMENTO, CALIF. - U.S. scientist Edward Teller - dubbed 'father of the H-Bomb' - has died in California. Teller, 95, played a key role in U.S. defence and energy policies for more than half a century. He was given his nickname because he championed the development of the atomic and hydrogen bombs, and nuclear power. He also also a strong proponent of the national missile defense system, known as "Star Wars." Teller also will be remembered for his role in destroying the career of his one-time boss, Robert Oppenheimer. Teller attacked Oppenheimer, who had directed the Manhattan Project, claiming he had slowed development of the H-bomb, allowing the Soviet Union to catch up. Oppenheimer was then frozen out of any government work. Teller suffered a stroke in his home on the campus of Stanford University in California. Written by CBC News Online

STANFORD, California (AP) --Edward Teller, who played a key role in U.S. defense and energy policies for more than half a century and was dubbed the "father of the H-bomb" for his enthusiastic pursuit of the powerful weapon, died Tuesday, a spokesman for Lawrence Livermore Laboratory said. He was 95.

Teller died in Stanford, California, near the Hoover Institute where he served as a senior research fellow. Teller exerted a profound influence on America's defense and energy policies, championing the development of the atomic and hydrogen bombs, nuclear power and the Strategic Defense Initiative. Among honors he received were the Albert Einstein Award, the Enrico Fermi Award and the National Medal of Science.

Yet Teller also will be remembered for his role in destroying the career of his one-time boss, Robert Oppenheimer -- which alienated Teller from many of his colleagues -- and for pushing the H-bomb and the Strategic Defense Initiative on grounds that, in the opinion of critics, were sketchy or dubious. Teller's staunch support for defense stemmed in part from two events that shaped his dark, distrustful view of world affairs -- the 1919 communist revolution in his native Hungary and the rise of Nazism while he lived in Germany in the early 1930s.

Even the end of the Cold War did not change Teller's view that the United States needed a strong defense. "The danger for ballistic missiles in the hands of 18 different nations has increased, and will increase, unless we have a defense," he said. "If we want to have stable, peaceful conditions, defense against sudden attack by rockets is more needed than ever."

Witty and personable, with a passion for playing the piano, Teller nevertheless was a persuasive Cold Warrior who influenced presidents of both parties. In 1939, he was one of three scientists who encouraged Einstein to alert President Franklin Roosevelt that the power of nuclear fission -- the splitting of an atom's nucleus -- could be tapped to create a devastating new weapon.

Two years later, even before the first atom bomb was completed, fellow scientist Fermi suggested that nuclear fusion -- fusing rather than splitting nuclei -- might be used for an even more destructive explosive, the hydrogen bomb. Teller quickly took to the idea. Teller's enthusiasm and pursuit of such a bomb -- he called it the "Super" -- won him the title "father of the H-bomb," a term he said he hated. The first megaton H-bomb was exploded in 1952.

In 1995, Teller looked back a half-century and wondered if the United States could have showed Japan the tremendous power of the bombs without destroying the cities. Some scientists had suggested at the time that a bomb be exploded in the sky miles over Tokyo harbor in hopes of scaring Japan into surrendering with a minimum of casualties.

"I think we shared the opportunity and the duty, which we did not pursue, to find ... a possibility to demonstrate" the bomb, Teller said at a 50th anniversary forum. "Now in retrospect I have a regret." Still, he defended the existence of atomic weapons, saying, "The second half of the century has been incomparably more peaceful than the first, simply by putting power into the hands of those people who wanted peace." In his memoirs, published several years ago, Teller added: "I deeply regret the deaths and injuries that resulted from the atomic bombings, but my best explanation of why I do not regret working on weapons is a question: What if we hadn't?"

Edward Teller was born Jan. 15, 1908, in Budapest. He received his university education in Germany, earning a Ph.D. in physics at the University of Leipzig. In 1935, Teller and his wife, Mici, came to the United States, where Teller was a professor at George Washington University until 1941, the same year the Tellers became U.S. citizens. Teller joined the Manhattan Project in 1942 at Los Alamos (New Mexico) Scientific Laboratory to work on developing the first atomic bomb. He also promoted the hydrogen fusion bomb, a concept that attracted interest but remained secondary to the work on the atomic weapon. After the success of the Manhattan Project, Teller left in 1946 to become a physics professor at the University of Chicago.

In a 1990 interview with The Associated Press, Teller said that development of Livermore Lab was one of his most important accomplishments. "A single laboratory is not capable of criticizing itself," he said. "By competition, the quality of work is greatly increased." While Teller was beginning his work at Livermore, he began attacking Oppenheimer, who had directed the Manhattan Project. Teller claimed Oppenheimer had slowed development of the H-bomb, allowing the Soviet Union to catch up. In two secret interviews with the FBI in 1952 -- made public under the Freedom of Information Act in 1977 -- Teller made statements casting doubt on Oppenheimer's actions. The allegations became the basis for the most serious charges brought against Oppenheimer in 1954 when his security clearance was lifted. In his memoirs, Teller remained critical of Oppenheimer but said the hearing was a mistake and that he was stupid to testify. Teller also said he was motivated not by Oppenheimer's opposition to the hydrogen bomb but by the way Oppenheimer had treated a third man.

Yet Teller himself may have unwittingly spurred the Soviet H-bomb project. Teller ignored doubts by physicists about his H-bomb design at a conference in 1946 and went ahead with an optimistic assessment of the project. The result was an eventual go-ahead from Truman, and a leak to the Soviets about the superbomb from conference participant Klaus Fuchs. Fuchs' information, based on Teller's flawed early design, may actually have misled the Soviets and hampered their H-bomb program. But the United States' decision to forge ahead with its own project had the effect of laying down a challenge to the Soviets. In the end, Teller was right about the feasibility of the H-bomb, but he repeated the same pattern of seeming to oversell technology in 1983 when he persuaded President Reagan that space-based laser weapons could provide a secure anti-missile defense.

Reagan bought the idea and proposed the multibillion-dollar Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed "Star Wars." Computer experts raised doubts early on about the reliability of the complex software required for a Star Wars system. But even as the evidence mounted that Star Wars would cost billions more than originally expected and would take years longer to develop, Teller continued to support it. In an interview in 2001, Teller showed his old fighting spirit, delivering the two-word endorsement -- "High time!" -- to President George W. Bush's decision to pull out of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty with Russia to work on a missile defense shield.

Under a program called the Marine Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles, or MEFFV, the Corps intends to replace the M1 Abrams tank and the Light Armored Vehicle with much nimbler and technologically advanced platforms. According to preliminary concepts, the new family of vehicles would include a 10-ton wheeled variant (the LAV replacement) and a 30-ton tracked version that would replace the tank. Like the Army's Future Combat Systems, the MEFFV would rely on stealth, speed and digital communications links to overcome the smaller size and lack of protective armor.

The Defense Department's Joint Requirements Oversight Council endorsed the MEFFV program in November 2001. Senior Marine officials, however, may be reevaluating the rationale for the MEFFV, as feedback from operations in Iraq indicates that heavy armor still rules the battlefield. "The Iraq conflict will change the MEFFV program," said Col. Dennis W. Beal, Marine Corps program manager for tanks. During an April meeting of Marine general officers, the consensus was that if the Corps had been fighting in Iraq with a MEFFV-like force, "we probably would not have won," Beal said at a Washington, D.C. conference, sponsored by the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement.

Any tank replacement would have to be at least as survivable as the M1, Beal suggested. Reports from the field indicated that many of the Marine M1 tanks came back with lots of pockmarks from rocket-propelled grenade shots and some friendly-fire hits, but the crews survived. "We may have to rethink some of the things we are thinking about," said Beal. "We are still trying to continue to make this [MEFFV] happen. But survivability is going to be a real key factor."

An obvious conclusion, Beal said, is that "we need a new gun" to supplant the current 120 mm tank weapon. "We don't want a vehicle that only has 40 rounds when it crosses the line of departure. We don't want a vehicle that only gets 8 gallons to the mile." It is not yet clear how many vehicles will comprise the MEFFV program. The Marines, said Beal, may not replace their 400 tanks and 800 LAVs with the exact same number of MEFFV vehicles. Beal, who retired in mid-July, supports the notion that the Marine Corps ' future combat vehicles should take advantage of the latest technology, particularly the research and development work the Army is sponsoring in the FCS program. But he seemed dismissive of the idea that the MEFFV and the FCS should be 100-percent common. The MEFFV has a "different timeline and different objective" than the FCS, Beal said. Both program offices, however, are collaborating and trying to maximize common components and subsystems. "How that's going to work out, we don't know yet," he added.

transportable, because the MEU typically would not have enough birds to shuttle vehicles. A MEU only has four CH-53 heavy lift helicopters. "No MEU commander is going to waste his airlift assets to bring one stinking LAV or one MEFFV to drop it down. He'll get it ashore some other way." As far as survivability goes, several research projects are under way. The Office of Naval Research is developing composite alloys materials that potentially could turn into lightweight armor. Another effort is on embedded sensors, which would make the vehicle less visible.

Active protection could be considered, if the Army adopts it for FCS. Unlike the FCS concept, the MEFFV will rely on armor for survivability. "My MEU won't have the [FCS] net-fires capability." The primary constraint in the design of any MEFFV is the transportability aboard ships and landing craft. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (of about 2,000 Marines) deploys with all its equipment on three ships. "That is not going to change drastically in 30-40 years," Beal said. "Everything has to be shoehorned into three vessels." An Army FCS brigade-with hundreds of manned and unmanned ground and air vehicles-would not fit in a three-ship amphibious ready group, said Beal. "I'm not disagreeing with the Army's approach. It's a sound and valid approach. It just doesn't work" for the Marines. No matter how "far thinking" Pentagon planners may be, "the bottom line is the box we have to live in," said Beal. Marine vehicles cannot be taller than 74 inches, for example, because they need to be able to operate below the threshold of line-of-sight anti-tank missiles. Having the two programs co-located makes sense as a way to encourage "technology synergy," he said. The first version of MEFFV is not even scheduled to be fielded until 2024, possibly more than a decade after

FCS enters service. "We have different transportation requirements, direct and indirect fire requirements. Timeframes are different. Even if we had the perfect solution for the Marine Corps in 2008 or 2010, it wouldn't really matter," said Beal. "Our procurement profile would not allow us to buy anything during that time anyway."

In the MEFFV program, unlike the FCS, "we don't have the money," said Beal. "I envy their program significantly." It is unlikely that any procurement dollars for MEFFV would be available until after 2015, mostly because the Marine Corps will be spending a large portion of its acquisition funds on the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle. The commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Michael W. Hagee, said that, even though the AAAV is at the top of the list, it will not necessarily drain every other program's accounts. "Our number one ground priority is in fact the AAAV," he said in an interview with Washington D.C. reporters. "But it's a misstatement to say that after 2006, all our money is going to the AAAV." In general, said Hagee, "I feel good about the funding as far as vehicles are concerned. There is always balancing."

According to Beal, the most "exciting" technology that may emerge from the MEFFV program is the electromagnetic gun. After evaluating more conventional weapons, such as kinetic-energy missiles and directed-energy systems, "we came to the conclusion that the EM gun shows the greatest potential." It is fair to predict, said Beal, that even today's most advanced explosive reactive armor will not be able to defeat many anti-tank munitions. "Every five years, we spend $80 million to $100 million to develop a new bullet, which [as new threats emerge], becomes ineffective before the production runs out." Preferably, a weapon system should "give me considerable overmatch over a considerable period of time." The EM gun also would be a welcome addition to the Abrams fleet, he said. The M1A1 will be in the Marine Corps until 2030. "We've reached the limits of the 120 mm gun. So we wanted a weapon system that we could transition to the M1A1."

defeat at T-90 type vehicle." Inert tungsten rounds are one-fifth the weight of the Abrams bullets. The logistics implications are huge, said Beal. "Your round count goes from 40 to about 95 to 120." Further, inert rounds do not require propellant, "so you don't have to worry about the heat or sensitivity to the environment." The Navy, said Beal, "is going to be giddy about this.

They won't have live ordnance on ships." Another benefit of the EM gun is the low cost of the ammunition. The potential savings are substantial, said Beal. In the Marine Corps, ammunition is the second largest expense, after personnel costs. Current tank rounds cost nearly $6,000 each. The EM rounds would cost about $400-$500.

The Pentagon allocated funds for the Marines to demonstrate a direct-fire EM gun by 2008. If it works, it would be integrated in a tank by 2015, Beal said. "The M1A1 is the perfect transition platform. If I can't engineer and scale this down to a tank, I'll never get to a platform half that size." Despite his optimistic outlook on the EM gun technology, Beal acknowledged that there are many "unknowns" in the program and that much could go wrong. The Army has a similar program to develop an EM gun. "We'll work together," said Beal. "But the Army has no plans at all to retrofit or upgrade their Abrams vehicles. That's a big difference in our program. They think FCS will be done by then." The Navy is sponsoring a large-scale EM gun development program, but there is little commonality with the Marine effort, said Beal. "They don 't have the real-estate problem I have. They can get big capacitors on a ship." If the EM weapon ever comes to fruition, it would mean bad news for contractors in the ammunition sector, he said. "This puts the bullet guys ... and the missile mafia ... out of business," he said. "Life is tough."

In looking as the casualties of the last conflict in Iraq, the question has been asked “What penetrated the Abrams” which was followed by several articles and many pictures of the knocked out tank. This led to a discussion of the Abrams versus modern Russian tanks. The following came from the warplans list.

I guess we're looking at the same thing a little differently. When I said a '"first string" armor threat,' I wasn't specifically talking about just hardware, although obviously that's a big piece of it. From all that I've read of Iraqi's armor forces, 1991 or now, we're not talking about a force really capable of armored warfare of the caliber of the US. They may have some of the raw equipment, but they couldn't see our tanks much of the time, couldn't hit our tanks that they did see much of the time, had few effective tactics for the equipment they did have much of the time, and to top it off, I've read in several places over the years that the majority of their sabot rounds were domestically produced, so lord knows what kind of quality they were. Even if that last part is untrue information, I think history's lopsided scorecard of Iraqi-vs-US losses in tank combat pretty much reveals that we weren't up against a comparible force. This wasn't a few lucky encounters...our guys could generally see and hit the Iraqis well before the Iraqis could see and hit our guys, thanks to better optics, a computerized fire control system, and good crew training. In no way do I intend to disparage US armor troopers, but I don't think the two forces were comparible.

I would agree with you that the T-80 probably isn't 'all that much better' as the T-72 to a degree and I believe even the T-90 relies on the same basic 125mm gun as the other two (which I'm assuming the Russians think can do the job). However, if the Iraqis in 1991 or today had T-80s, with fire-control computers, better sighting systems, improved tube-fired ATGMs, more agility from the gas turbine engine, and Russian-made sabot rounds, they probably could have knocked out M1s. They still didn't have the advantages of US intelligence, or training, but perhaps it would have been a little less lopsided fight. I know it's all theoretical navel-gazing on my part, obviously, and I'm perfectly happy it was a lopsided fight, but if it leads to an aura of invincibility for our M1s, I don't think that's a good outcome of it.- John Sponauer

"Booze was rarest of all in the Pacific. Not only did the Army not provide it but there was hardly any indigenous production outside of Australia and New Zealand. As Sergeant M.S. Babcock, 37th US Division wrote: 'Dipsomaniac soldiers on the South Sea islands lack regular supplies of liquor. In Fiji liquor could be obtained over a bar but rarely could a soldier reach the bar when it was open. He was too far away or in the field. However, Indian bootleggers were intermittently contacted selling a sundry collection of rot-gut at prices ranging from twelve to eighteen dollars a quart. A scant supply of beer is now provided in the New Hebrides.'

On Guadalcanal, the first and last issue of beer was on Christmas Eve. Non-Drinkers were offered up to $3 a can. There were only two reasonable supplies of liquor for enlisted men in this theatre. One was Air Force and Navy personnel with whom a lively barter trade in souvenirs was established: 'The Air Corps men could and would pay higher because it was they who imported the booze... [On the regular transport runs] they stuffed every available bit of space with bottles or cases of scotch.. A silk battle flag, preferably bloodstained, was always worth at least three Imperial quarts. A rifle, on the other hand would hardly bring a pint... A typical, normal 'Samurai sabre' was always worth five Imperial quarts at least, and the better grade ones with gold and ivory chasing could bring as high as nine Imperial quarts... Men who had [money] but no souvenirs to trade were known to pay as high as fifty dollars for one Imperial quart of scotch.'

...'raisin jack' or... 'swipe', which was a Hawaian word for bootleg liquor... In my outfit we got blind asshole drunk every chance we got... We made our 'swipe' by stealing a five-gallon tin of canned peaches or plums or pineapple from the nearest ration dump, and putting a double handful of sugar in it to help it ferment, then leaving it out in the sun in the jungle... It was the most godawful stuff to drink, sickly sweet and smelling very raunchy, but if you could get enough of it down and keep it down, it carried a wonderful wallop.'

Another favorite for fermentation was coconut milk, and Australian troops in the Pacific also used this type of liquor, generally known as 'jungle juice', in large quantities. Sometimes even cruder methods were used. James Jones remembered a PX on Guadalcanal in which only two items were left for the front-line troops, Barbasol shaving cream and Aqua Velva aftershave. The Barbasol remained on the shelves, but the Aqua Velva went like hotcakes. 'Mixed with canned grapefruit juice... the shaving lotion did not taste at all. Grapefruit juice seemed to cut all the perfume out of it. It made a drink rather like a Tom Collins. Everyone loved it.' "(p.257-258)

Tavor" TAR-21 is the latest development of Israeli Military Industries (IMI). It is intended as an infantry main assault rifle and in the future should change Colt M-16A2 and Galil ARM used by Israel armed forces. Rifle is serially produced on IMI plants. It was developed using "bullpup" constructional scheme what seems to be very popular among new generation weapons.

"Bullpup" constructional scheme has a number advantages comparing with traditional weapons. Firstly it allows to lower weapons length what makes fire comfortable not only in the battlefield but in limited space areas as armored personnel carriers as well. Secondly gas recoil power is pushing weapon directly back what avoids barrels tossing up after each shot or series what is ordinary to traditional scheme weapon. So "bullpap" scheme weapons have better fire accuracy. Thirdly "bullpup" scheme allows to execute fire using only one hand.

"Tavor's" TAR-21 is made almost fully from high extra hard plastic. Assault rifle works on gas returning principle. Reloading handle can be placed from both sides what make it easy to use both for right- or left-handed rifleman. It allows executing single or automatic fire. Rifle use optical sight as a main sight placed on standard bracket. There is also ability to use other higher capacity optics or night sight.

Alongside with TAR-21 on the same weapons base Israel Military Industry have built a wide assortment of rifles. Compact version CTAR-21 with shortened till 380 mm barrel overall weapons length is 640 mm. Assault rifle is intended for airborne and tank troops. Micro variant MTAR-21 with 250 mm barrel and 480 mm length. It is intended for drivers, artillery crews, staff personnel and communication troops. "Tavor's" modifications from "Steyr" AUG differs in that way that TAR family doesn't only changes barrel but has independent construction with shortened overall length. There is also produced sniper version STAR-21 with heavier barrel, higher magnification optics and folding bearing legs.

2. M15 antitank mine Tellermine 42 Germany (WWII). At the risk of splitting hairs, I think it is more accurate to say the M15 is an enlarged version of the WWII vintage US M6 AT mine. The M6 was inspired by the design of the tellermine (particularly the tellermines 42 and 43), however, there are significant differences between them, for example, the M6/M15 use an integral Belleville spring.

3. M16-series antipersonnel mines Schutzenmine 44 Germany (WWII). I believe your reference here is to the Splittermine 44. The Schutzenmine 44 is a shu mine similar to the Soviet PMD-6 hinged wooden box mine. Once again at the risk of splitting hairs, I think it is more accurate to say the M16 was inspired by the design of the S-mine (both the 35 and 44), however, there are significant differences between them, for example, the original M16 uses a central fuze well, vice the offset one in the S-mine 44. Here is what I have on this subject: "The US Army began their belated development of modern antipersonnel mines like the "Bouncing Betty" only as a direct result of the dismal failure of the French offensive into Germany's Saar region (mentioned above). US antipersonnel mine development finally began in the summer of 1940, almost a year after WWII had begun in Europe. At this point, Major Pierre Delalande (a former member of the French Corps of Engineers who had escaped from France following the German conquests in 1940) had reached the US with the designs for the French M-1939 bounding antipersonnel mine (which was based on the German S-mine). This eventually lead to the fielding of the US M-2 series of antipersonnel mines beginning in April 1942, which used a 60mm mortar round. However, the M2 proved deficient in combat, consequently, the US developed their M16 directly from the German S-mine after the war."

As General Freyberg observed, "Any attack on a prepared position must anticipate encountering minefields and wire. It is considered that the Bangalore Torpedo remains the best method of enabling infantry to get through wire entanglements with booby traps, and they should be carried with the leading waves of the attacking troops."

After considering the effectiveness Russian barbed wire obstacles against the Japanese during the Siege of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, Captain McClintock of the Bengal, Bombay and Madras Sappers and Miners had invented this pipe bomb in 1912. It took its name from the city of Bangalore India where it was developed. The original torpedo was 5.5 meters long and held 27.2 kilograms of dynamite. During raids, the World War I German pioneers' "mission is to blow up entanglements with long charges [Bangalore torpedoes] and dugouts with boxes of melinite."

The Bangalore Torpedo was invented by Captain McClintock of the Bengal, Bombay and Madras Sappers and Miners in 1912. It took its name from Bangalore India where it was developed. The Bangalore Torpedo was developed to counter the problem posed by the rise of barbed wire obstacles during the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. The original torpedo was a 5.5m length of pipe filled with 27.2 kg of dynamite.iv Apparently, most (if not all) of the Bangalore torpedoes used by the WWI combatants were improvised. A German example was made of 2-inch pipe with a length between three and twenty feet long. During August and September of 1918, the US 29th Infantry Division, with the 104th Engineer Regiment attached, operated with the French. During this time, "C Company participated in two raids, its function being to breach the enemy wire by use of bangalore torpedoes, which proved unnecessary, as the explosives were not used in either instance, it being found that the supporting barrage had entirely laid the wire." Early in World War II, it was found to be effective at clearing a path

through minefields. This device remains a standard item in most armies to this day. Experimentation for a supplemental system that that would use a bullet trap rifle grenade or small rocket to deploy a length of detonating cord were begun by the US in 1944, however these devices have not been particularly successful and have not been generally accepted to date. M1E1 fielded, sent to Nam and used by USMC. A more likely successor is the US APOBS (of which 36 were employed during Operation Desert Storm) which is based on the Israeli developed POMINS.

The demolition "Snake" was an overgrown Bangalore torpedo that was pushed by a tank into a minefield and then detonated to breach the obstacle. These also appear to have been available to the 8th Army. The Allies' demolition snake appears to have been based on an earlier German field expedient called a Ladungsschieber. This was a 25-meter long set of Gestreckte Ladungen, improvised Bangalore torpedoes made (according to the manual) of 5-meter lengths of 16-gauge steel pipe and loaded with blasting gelatine or other suitable explosives. These Gestreckte Ladungen were then supposed to be mounted on 5 sets of improvised wheels that placed the Gestreckte Ladung 35cm above the ground and allowed two dismounted pioneers or a vehicle to push the Ladungsschieber into a minefield. One Ladungsschieber was supposed to be able to clear a four to six meter wide breach. Larger breaches were possible by varying the design and fabrication of the device. Two Ladungsschieber with four meters between them (presumably with bracing between them to maintain this spacing, but the manual does not state this) would clear an eight to ten meter wide breach, while longer breaches could be created by adding more Gestreckte Ladungen.ix This technique was also copied by the Soviets.

The Allied version of the demolition snake was first developed by a Canadian combat engineer named Major A. T. MacLeanx of the 11th Field Company (stationed in England at the time) starting in October 1941. The Canadian snake was originally nicknamed the "Worthington Wiggler," after F. F. Worthington, M.C., M. M., commander of the 1st Canadian Tank Brigade. It consisted of sections of 3 inch (76mm) diameter pipe loaded with explosive, which could be coupled together in lengths up to 400 feet. It was supposed to be towed to the edge of a minefield by one tank and then it was to be pushed, as a unit, ahead of another tank across a minefield. The subsequent detonation would clear a vehicle wide path through the field. It was demonstrated successfully in February and March 1942.xi Although the "Snake" was apparently available to the 8th Army, no reports of their use during the Battle of El Alamein have been found. An American observer with the 8th Army reported, "The Snake is not considered to be suitable for extensive use in the Middle East because the results obtained with it depend

so largely upon terrain. In hard ground suitable gaps in minefields can be cleared, but in soft sand, it is quite possible that mines 2 or 3 feet from the Snake will not be detonated."xii It was first used in combat by Valentine tanks in the latter stages of the North African campaign.xiii

The "big brother" of the Bangalore Torpedo, demolition "Snake" was first developed by a Canadian combat engineer named Major A. T. MacLean of the 11th Field Company starting in October 1941. It was originally nicknamed the "Worthington Wiggler," after F. F. Worthington, M.C., M.M., commander of the 1st Canadian Tank Brigade. Basically on oversized Bangalore Torpedo, it consisted of sections of 76mm (3 inch) diameter pipe loaded with explosive, which when coupled together in lengths up to 130 meters, could be pushed as a unit ahead of a tank across a minefield. The subsequent detonation was supposed to clear a vehicle-wide path through the field. It was demonstrated successfully in February and March 1942. Although the British and American armies had been equipped with a small number of them during the campaign in North Africa, they were not used in combat until the US 1st Armored Division employed them on 23 May 1944 during the breakout from the Anzio Beachhead.xv (QUOTE ARMY GREENS?)

The successor to the "Snake" was a British made rocket deployed flexible line charge called the "Conger." It consisted of 300 meters of specially woven 50mm diameter flexible hose, which was launched across a minefield by a 130mm rocket. After the hose was deployed, it was pumped full with 1,200 kg of Nitroglycerine based liquid explosive (822C). This liquid explosive proved to be extremely dangerous. As a result, the `Conger' was only employed in combat once, when the British 79th Armoured Division used it during the battle for Calais on 25 September 1944. QUOTE 79 AD HISTORY. Modern mineclearing line charges like the US MICLIC, the Russian UR-77, and the British Giant Viper are descended from this device.Mongoose...KNALLNETZ?

While up north I visited two friends in Alexandria. One just retired from the AF as a Lt. Colonel and does consulting for Aerospace, and the other a solid state physicist who has been at Ft. Belvoir at the Night Vision Laboratory. He has been working on the thermal masks and night vision goggles. He says the 3rd phase is to have both in the same apparatus. Both worked with me at the Bartol Research Foundation which was funded for pure physics. It was an interesting visit. H