TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PACIFIC
LTC WILLIAM L. HOWARD
Technical Intelligence in WW II probably had its origins in the reports sent back from Germany by Captain Rene Studler and the military attache in Berlin, Col. Truman Smith, filed and forgotten until the war started, they were supplemented by reports on captured material sent back to the states by then Captain George Jarrett, an ammunition advisor to the British forces in North Africa. Many of the items that he sent back were also filed and forgotten until the establishment, in 1943, of the Foreign Material Branch.
As the war progressed, the need for technical information on enemy weapons increased. Special teams were formed to evacuate captured enemy material. By the end of WW II in Europe there were over 4,000 people conducting some form of technical investigation. Many were duplicating the efforts of others! Although a wealth of information was generated, much of it was too late to be of immediate importance. The situation in the Pacific at the start of the war was not very much better. When the United States was plunged into a Far Eastern war with Japan by the bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, we came face to face with the fact that we knew little or nothing about that Island empire. What had Japan in the way of an Army and Navy? What about their Marianas outposts and the other Jap mandated islands? How and with what weapons would the Japanese fight? Many of these questions in the early phases of the war were unanswered. We had a war on our hands yet we were uncertain of the enemy's capabilities. Our Technical Intelligence was practically non-existent --, and we almost lost the war as a result.We found the enemy much more potent than most strategists had expected, and we paid for underestimating his strength with a series of strategic withdrawals to the south.We lost important bases for a counter offensive -- the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, Java, Borneo, the entire group of islands to the north of New Guinea, even the northern portion of New Guinea itself. With only two American and two Australian divisions between them and a completion of the conquest of the whole Western Pacific, the Japs were finally stopped on the Kokada Trail in their drive toward the Allied base at Port Moresby. The comeback looked long and hard. Over three thousand miles of ocean with thousands of Jap-garrisoned islands lay between us and Tokyo. We now knew the enemy's capabilities and how absolutely his whole home economy had been geared to total war, but an army in retreat learns little of the enemy's material, equipment and weapons, except their terrific effect. These were among the major objectives of the Allies; to know what weapons the enemy had so that we could devise countermeasures and countertactics of our own; to exploit important discoveries for our own benefit; to win the technological race.
Jap Type 96 LMG
In the earliest months of the war the United States had a mere handful of Technical Intelligence men in the Pacific Theater, dependent for training upon the Australian Army. Then Technical Intelligence was taken over by the Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service sections of the united States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) under the supervision of their respective service. Their operations, beginning in a small way, culminated 3 January 1944 in the formation of a coordinated organization of the six major services, the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional). The 470 technical experts administered through this company kept the Allied Forces informed of Japanese progress in arms, ammunition and equipment. They were the eyes and the ears of the army in the battle of the Pacific. As differentiated from the enemy in Europe, the Japanese fought, in many cases, on a shoestring; their tenuous supply lines, reaching to the various island groups, were generally severed before the Allied troops went into operation and backlogs of enemy supplies were consequently well depleted; surrender en masse, such as occurred in Europe, with the accompanying seizure of large stores of enemy supplies, was unknown in the war with Japan until the summer of 1945 -- when the war was over. The capture, then, of any considerable quantity of Japanese equipment was a matter of great Intelligence importance.
December 1942 -- January 1944
From the opening of the Pacific War until November 1942, there was little Technical Intelligence activity in the Southwest Pacific Area (S.W.P.A.). A few small arms and some ammunition plus a few items of Chemical Warfare equipment were turned into the Ordnance and Chemical Warfare officers for examination and then forwarded by both American and Australian forces to the Australian Army for examination, test and report. No organized attempt had been made, however, to have Technical Intelligence carried into the field by a team of men skilled in collecting and analyzing captured enemy equipment. In November 1942, Training Circular No. 81 established a more closely knit control for processing captured enemy equipment of Intelligence value. The flow of material was from combat troops (there were, as yet, no Technical Intelligence teams) to service troops in the combat zone, to the theater special staff officer of the appropriate service, to the Chief of the appropriate service in the United States. Flow of informational reports was through channels from the combat troops to the S-2 or G-2, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, (AC of S) to the War Department, as well as interchangeably with the service troops handling the material.
Combat personnel capturing equipment of new design sent it rearward through normal recovery channels together with accessories, ammunition, and pertinent information, each service handling its own equipment. Simultaneously, a report was rendered through channels. Maintenance and supply service personnel delivered captured equipment, with no maintenance other than the application of preservatives, direct to the Theater special staff officer of the same arm or service or to his designated establishment (such as a base shop or depot). Report was made at the same time to the G-2 of their command. Both combat and maintenance personnel recovering a new type of material of a class supplied by another service delivered it to the nearest organization of the appropriate service. Theater staff officers were responsible for preliminary expert analysis as to the characteristics of the material. Based upon this, they made preliminary deductions as to the state of enemy resources for war, as evidenced by the material, and published preliminary operators and maintenance manuals, with instructions on local modifications that could be made so that the captured equipment could be used by United Nations troops in the field. These reports, together with the captured material (half of the captured material went to the Australians, half to the United States) were then transmitted to the chief of the arm or service concerned in the United States. Complete reports were also made by the Theater staff officers to the G-2 of the Theater staff, and necessary arrangements were made when possible to exploit the enemy material when captured in large quantities. The chief of each supply arm or service in the Zone of the Interior made final analysis and deductions and prepared final operator's and maintenance manuals and visual training aids. The Theater G-2, under the provisions of this circular, it will be noted, merely transmitted information on the equipment and had no responsibility in its processing. As the battle for Buna and Gona, New Guinea, was drawing to a close in December 1942, a group of five Ordnance officers and ten enlisted men were preparing to leave the United States for the Southwest Pacific Area. These men were specialists in ammunition, small arms artillery, fire control equipment, and tracked and wheeled vehicles. Prior to their departure they were given an intensive indoctrination in Ordnance Technical Intelligence at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and at Washington, D.C. On arrival at Headquarters, United States Army Service of Supply (USASOS),Base 3, Brisbane, Australia, on 30 December 1942, Major Alan C. Johnston, ranking officer, was placed in charge of the group to set up an Ordnance Technical Intelligence organization for the Theater. The program was to operate under the technical control of the Chief Ordnance officer, USASOS, in accordance with general policies established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the headquarters. The detachment was broken down into three sections: The Administrative Section, besides being responsible for the general supervision of Ordnance Intelligence activities, issued reports, maintained liaison with United States and Australian Technical Intelligence organizations in other theaters, collected new data issued in the Pacific Theater on Japanese Ordnance material, and forwarded this information to the Chief of Ordnance, Washington D.C. The second section consisted of Technical Intelligence Field Teams composed of an officer and one or more enlisted men, who operated from an advance base or with a task force, division or corps. Their duties were to collect, identify, prepare preliminary reports on new items, and ship captured Japanese material to the Ordnance Analysis Section. The third Section was the Ordnance Analysis Section, located at Brisbane, Australia, which received material from field teams, analyzed and prepared reports on new items, prepared and shipped Japanese Ordnance material to United States troops in the Theater for training and to the United States for Technical investigation and training, and maintained liaison with Technical Intelligence organizations in the vicinity (such as the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) of General Headquarters, (GHQ) SWPA, with General Staff, Intelligence, of the Australian Army at Australian Land Headquarters and with the Master General of Ordnance, in Melbourne). There was considerable flexibility in these sections and personnel were often used interchangeably, i.e., headquarters analysis section personnel went into the field and vice versa. From January until July, when part of the personnel were pulled for field work, the Ordnance analysis section reported in great detail on practically all of the material that was captured. They issued 26 complete technical reports -- one report on the 75mm AA gun, was over 50 pages long, and contained 30 photographs. Technical Intelligence personnel received training and information from the Australian Army in the early days, which was quite valuable. Capt Madigan, the Assistant O.I.C., and two enlisted men spent 19 days in Melbourne in January 1943, at the office of the Master General of Ordnance in Wesley College, looking over their complete collection of Japanese Ordnance, taking the weapons apart, studying and analyzing them. Though Technical Intelligence was never actually under the Australian Army for administration, except in the same capacity as the other United States forces were attached for early operations, the alliance and cooperation was close and was of great benefit to both armies. Later, in February 1943, when Technical Intelligence was turned over to United States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE). Major Johnston was appointed Technical Intelligence Officer, operating under the direct control of the Chief Ordnance Officer, USAFFE. Capt. Madigan, at that time operating out of Base "B", Oro Bay, New Guinea, took charge of all field teams; he also assumed responsibility for investigating the Japanese Ordnance material held by the Master General of Ordnance, Australian Army; and from 6 March to 11 July 1943 went on temporary duty with the 42 Chemical Laboratory Company to investigate Japanese explosives and ammunition.
Whereas Ordnance Technical Intelligence personnel had been sent directly to the Pacific from the United States, the Chemical Warfare Intelligence Section was formed locally. Throughout 1942, new types of captured enemy equipment were sent to the Chemical Warfare Service Intelligence Officer, Headquarters, New Guinea Forces, Australia, who made the preliminary examination and determined its operational significance. It was then sent to Land Headquarters, Australian Army, Melbourne, (later, Advance Land Headquarters, Brisbane) for Technical Intelligence. Land Headquarters then issued the equipment to the appropriate arm or service for complete technical analysis and report. Chemical Warfare munitions were sent to either 42d Chemical Laboratory or the Victoria Munitions Supply Laboratory, Marybyrnong, Victoria, Australia. The entire channel of evacuation was Australian. This was improved somewhat in January 1943, when arrangements were made for United States Chemical Warfare Intelligence Officers to be notified of material sent back from the forward area by United States forces so that they could work with Land Headquarters, Australian Army, on the disposition of that material. There was, however, no established Chemical Warfare Intelligence organization. The work was carried on as one of the functions of the chemical laboratories under the supervision of the Technical Intelligence officer of the Chemical Warfare Section, Headquarters, USASOS. Their analysis consisted merely of examining and reporting on Japanese chemical material. It became apparent that in addition to the laboratory analysis, an organization was needed which could collect equipment and study Japanese tactics, method and preparations for chemical warfare. In February 1943, when USAFFE was activated, a Chemical Warfare Section was set up in that Headquarters with an Intelligence officer detailed to formulate plans for more comprehensive Intelligence organization. At this time there were two officers and one enlisted man in the Chemical Intelligence Section, Headquarters, USASOS: To these was added another officer, responsible for documents research and publications. In addition, three officers and three enlisted men were assigned to three field Chemical Warfare Intelligence teams working under the direction of Headquarters USAFFE in the forward areas. On 27 May 1943 the Commanding General, USASOS, was directed to "establish a salvage depot for captured enemy equipment, conveniently located in relation to the captured enemy equipment depot of the Australian Army now located in Base Section 3". The Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service analysis sections were still separate from the depot, which was used only for shipping and receiving equipment; and still there was no Technical Intelligence by Engineers, Medical Corps, Quartermaster or Signal Corps; nevertheless, it was the first step toward coordination. At the same time, Technical Intelligence of the United States and Australia was more closely coordinated through the activation of the Joint Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board which replaced Land Headquarters in determining the final disposition of captured equipment. All material received at both the United States and Australian depots was checked by the Allied Enemy Equipment Board for disposition. The Board, consisting of two members from the United States, two from the Australian forces, and one from Allied Naval Forces, made disposition of material based on Technical training needs. This permitted both forces to obtain items which might not otherwise be available. Major Johnston was appointed as a member of this board in June 1943. During the period 16 June to 8 September 1943, CWS Intelligence Team No. 1 was sent on temporary duty to United States Advance Base, Port Moresby, New Guinea. Their mission was to establish liaison with Technical Intelligence units from United States Army Ordnance, Fifth Air Force Naval Intelligence, the Royal Australian Air Force, and Headquarters New Guinea Forces. They were to clarify the channels through which enemy material and Intelligence reports and equipment would go, and to provide that such channels were functioning properly. At the same time, the team was to be prepared to proceed to any area to investigate matters of interest to Chemical Warfare. The Buna -- Gona -- Sanananda, New Guinea operations were conducted jointly by Australian forces and by I Corps, with the 32d Division bearing the brunt of the fighting. Ordnance Technical Intelligence which had just arrived in the Theater in December had a team in the field by 18 January. Two officers and four enlisted men were sent to Port Moresby to stage for two weeks for Buna -- Gona. During the next six months they covered this entire area and shipped back much valuable Ordnance equipment to Brisbane for analysis. In June, the officers returned to Brisbane and were assigned to the analysis section.
Technical Intelligence operations in SWPA had, in the past, been carried on by detachments of special staff sections operating under varying arrangements in regard to assignment of personnel and supervision of activities. In order to provide an efficient basis for operations of the various Technical Intelligence detachments, USASOS, G-2 Sauve; submitted a proposed plan of operation with a recommended T/O and T/E that included, for the first time, the six major services, (all except Transportation Corps) and that was estimated to be adequate for Theater needs, and recommended that a Technical Intelligence Composite company be activated. This proposal was forwarded to Commanding General USAFFE on 7 December 1943. It was felt that the suggested organization would give more satisfactory Technical Intelligence coverage since it included the six services, that it would make possible the necessary flexibility of operation and movement of personnel which was considered essential for the efficient functioning of the sections, and would enable the formation of well trained and balanced Technical Intelligence teams. Under this arrangement, the several Technical Intelligence sections would be able to facilitate the collection and rapid dissemination of Technical Intelligence information. It would also enable them to control the distribution of captured enemy equipment according to technical and training needs in the Theater and in the United States.
On 3 January 1944, the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite company, Separate (Provisional) was organized as a provisional company by General Orders No. 2, Headquarters USASOS, so that assignment of personnel could be made and operations continued. T/O and T/E previously suggested to USAFFE, were used as guides, with personnel carried on detached service from source units. The formation of a separate Technical Intelligence Composite Company other than provisional was not favorably considered by USAFFE.
On 20 January 1944, Chiefs of Services were directed to furnish qualified personnel for assignment on detached service to 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, separate (Provisional) "to enable the accomplishment of the Technical Intelligence mission". The transfer of personnel to the 5250th was effected by the six services concerned by February 1944. The principle of having a coordinating unit for Technical Intelligence proved highly satisfactory in the coming months of the war. Centralized control made it possible for teams from the six services to function as one unit, thus enabling them to aid each other during the first days of an operation when speed was important. Information, documents and equipment could be collected for all branches by all teams, and this equipment assembled in a central spot where it could be sorted and evaluated by the individual service team concerned. Coordination provided flexibility, made for greater ease and efficiency in matter of command, and eliminated the question concerning responsibility and scope of authority. Most important of all, coordination made it possible for the command to field adequately equipped teams formed and trained in time for all operations and assured complete coverage by Technical Intelligence. There was one very definite drawback, however -- the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company was established only as a provisional organization. This in certain ways, complicated its administration, left its personnel still occupying T/O vacancies in units which they had never worked, made it generally impossible to secure well earned and long deserved promotions, and because the company operated on only a quasi-accepted basis, sometimes ham-strung its efforts when it could have been most effective. Nevertheless, under the direction of the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional), a comprehensive view of Japanese capabilities was secured and Technical Intelligence centered the period when the work of past years brought in positive results. It was a big step forward. The 5250th was composed of a coordination and administration section, and a technical section for each of the six major services. Each Technical section, composed of laboratory and Enemy Equipment Intelligence Teams, operated under the technical supervision of the Chief of Service and under the general supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 USASOS. Duties, as originally outlined in the recommendation to USAFFE, were followed with only minor modification.
The Company Headquarters conducted administration of the Company and coordination of the activities of the several sections. In addition the Company commander was placed on duty in the Office of the AC of S, G-2 , USASOS, as Coordinator of Technical Intelligence. Major Johnston, Ord, in addition to his other duties, was appointed informally as temporary (without orders) commanding officer of the Company and G-2 Technical Intelligence Coordinator. In addition, one officer was on duty in the Office of the AC of S, G-2, USASOS, to conduct Technical Intelligence liaison with the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section SWPA. This responsibility was first delegated to Lt Col Jones, Chief Engineer Intelligence officer, and was later turned over to his assistant, Lt Girard R. Lowrey.
There was also a Service Technical Intelligence Officer assigned to each staff section. His duties were to advise the Chief of Service on Intelligence matters, to supervise Intelligence activities for the particular service, including training, collection, recording, storage and disposition of captured enemy materia, to collaborate with the Technical Intelligence sections of other services, and to review and issue reports on captured enemy material, installations and procedures, and to forward such information to their respective Chiefs of Service in Washington, D.C. One of the major elements of the company was the Administrative and Analysis Unit. Originally, only the Ordnance, Quartermaster and Signal sections operated analysis laboratories under the Chief of the Intelligence Section of the service concerned. Chemical Warfare Service continued to have its analysis work carried on at the 42d Chemical or Victoria Munitions Supply Laboratories, and Engineer and Medical Corps had no teams in the field until the Hollandia operation in April 1944. Laboratories for all the services were established after that.
Japanese Type 94-5 radio set
All Technical Intelligence sections, however, maintained administrative divisions, which, within the scope of their activities; advised the Chief of Service on Intelligence matters, coordinated and supervised Intelligence activities, planned, supervised, and correlated Intelligence training activities, established and maintained intelligence liaison, and collaborated with the Technical Intelligence sections of other arms and services and Allied Forces within the Theater, maintained adequate liaison with the Intelligence Division, Office of the Chief of Service, interpreted, evaluated and disseminated Intelligence information as prescribed and, in addition carried on adequate and necessary document research. They supervised the collection, recording, processing, storage and disposition of captured enemy material, obtained data on operational performance of captured enemy material, maintained a file of all reports and data available on Technical Intelligence, and reviewed and issued reports on captured enemy material, installations, procedure, etc. They also arranged for the shipment of selected items of captured enemy material to the United States for training and other purposes, as required. They also kept current, and submitted inventories of captured enemy equipment available to the service in the Captured Enemy Equipment Depot or service laboratories, or enroute to that depot, or in the advance areas, prepared preliminary training manuals on the use of captured enemy equipment, installations, etc., and assisted in planning a training program for United States personnel.
Type 94-5 radios
The third major element of the company were the Field Teams. These teams collected and forwarded technical combat information through G-2 of the task force to which they were assigned, arranged for the collection and forwarding of captured enemy equipment to the Service Chief for further analysis or to the Captured Enemy Equipment Depot or shipment to the United States, assisted and advised G-2 and the appropriate service officer of the task force on all matters of Technical Intelligence. They investigated reports of the use of new methods, weapons, or tactics, and submitted reports thereon through G-2 of the task force, made preliminary examination of, and reported on enemy equipment captured by the task force. They cooperated with Technical Intelligence personnel of other services and Allied forces and also assisted in interrogation of prisoners of war when requested to do so. They also collected information regarding enemy installations, and prepared reports thereon for forwarding, arranged for the salvage of bulk supplies and material, submitted reports on captured enemy material forwarded to the Captured Enemy Equipment Depot, and maintained current inventories of captured enemy material.
Evolution of Japanese Receivers
A fourth major sub-element was the Captured Enemy Equipment Depot, which operated directly under the supervision of the Chief, Quartermaster Intelligence Section. They received, classified and maintained stock record accounts on all captured enemy equipment forwarded to the Depot and delivered selected items of captured enemy equipment to the appropriate service or force upon authority received from the Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board. They packed and shipped to the United Stated selected items of captured enemy equipment, as directed, and prepared and kept current an inventory of captured enemy equipment and a record of the source and distribution of these items to be forwarded through channels at the proper time. A monthly report was prepared containing a list of captured enemy equipment forwarded to the United States during the month, and returned or forwarded to individuals for souveniring such items as were released on the certificate of the AC of S, G-2, USASOS, or other authorized agencies.
On 19 February 1944, a directive was received by Headquarters, USASOS, from the Commanding General, USAFFEE, to the effect that photographs, prints, rubbings and drawings of all nameplates or nameplate data from all captured enemy equipment would be forwarded to that Headquarters. The collection of nameplates and rubbings became one of the main missions of Technical Intelligence personnel. They were to send in literally thousands of these items during the coming months of war, and from information based on their translation (names, dates, etc.) Japanese manufacturers of war material were identified and located -- information that was important in determining air raid targets and in studying the enemy's economic status. Greater emphasis was also placed on analysis of captured equipment as an additional factor for the determination of the enemy's economic position. Sound deductions as to the state of enemy resources for war could be based on evidence obtained from a laboratory analyses of captured material. Technical reports included, when possible, conclusions, positive ornegative, as to the enemy's economic status. These conclusions were based on a comparison of material and workmanship of recently and previously captured equipment. When such changes were noted, these items were returned to the United States for further laboratory analysis. In February 1944 Major Johnston, accompanied by one officer from each of the other six services and 1st Lt James E. Shelby, QMC, proceeded to advanced areas to inform base sections and army troops that as each of the six services were interested in material, all captured Japanese equipment was desired and should be forwarded. At the same time he informed personnel of the modification of the regulation that facilitated legitimate souveniring. (It was hoped that this would encourage troops to turn in captured equipment, though it turned out that it had little effect on the willful looting and destruction of enemy dumps.) Major Johnston also informed forward echelons of the procedure necessary for shipment of captured material.
Technical Intelligence in the Pacific theater was designed to accomplish the following objectives:
First, the exploitation of material, including the examination and evaluation of available enemy material and deduction, from this evaluation, of the state of Japanese resources for war. Intelligence so obtained was exploited for the reciprocal benefit of the United States and Allied Armed Forces. This included examination of Japanese facilities which might be involved in the production of material for war and the provision of trained personnel to assist the chiefs of services (Ground, Naval and Air) in the supervision of the collection, safeguarding the evacuation of captured enemy equipment for Intelligence study and for tactical and training purposes.
Second objective of Technical Intelligence in the Pacific was the exploitation of documents. This involved providing trained personnel to screen and inventory enemy documents; circulating accession results, that is lists of documents received, to authorized agencies; extracting Intelligence needed for security and control by means of fragmentary translations or photostats; selecting military, technical, scientific and general documents for transmission to the United States pertaining the current target books published by the War and Navy Departments and the specific interests of specialist agencies; and, finally, focusing all field agencies of Ground, Naval and Air Forces through TIS for document activity.
Third objective of Technical Intelligence was the exploitation of Order of Battle Intelligence and related subject: This involved lists of all regular units (Ground, Naval and Air) lists of code names and numbers, T/O's and T/E's of all types of units; lists of divisions, brigades and major units of Ground, Naval and Air Forces by components, strength, armanent, etc; lists of recruiting districts and units trained therein; lists of Army and Navy officers and their commands, including directories of transfers and promotions, biographies and service records; histories of major units; investigations of recruiting and training systems, of Home Guard and Volunteer Defense Units; investigations of military police,together with records of special and secret service organizations, (Tokumu Kikan); investigations of military intelligence agencies, including histories, operations, etc; and, finaly, reports on military societies.
Fourth objective of Technical Intelligence was exploitation of historical records and official reports of the Japanese General Staff (Ground, Naval and Air). This included the organization of Japan for war, the preparatins for the War of 1941, campaigns in the Southwest Pacific Area from 1942 to 1944, campaigns in the Philippines from 1941 to 1942, second campaign in the Philippines in 1945, campaigns in the Pacific islands from 1941 to 1945, and campaigns in other areas from 1941 to 1945. The Army Air Corps had a similar operation, called the T.A.I.U for Technical Air Intelligence Unit and the Navy had similar organizations called M.E.I.U. for Mobile Explosive Investigation Units.
The experience in the Pacific set the stage for all future technical intelligence operations. The unit in Vietnam had an administration section, analytical sections and field teams. During Desert Storm, the same basic organization was set up in Saudi Arabia. Todays technical intelligence unit is organized along the same lines.
This short discussion was based on the official report of Technical Intelligence in the Southwest Pacific done by the army. For further information and copies of the reports done on Japanese radio and communication equipment contact the author.
